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ABSTRACT 
With NATO planning to complete the withdrawal of most troops from Afghanistan by 
the end of 2014, both Afghanistan and the Coalition need to define a positive long-term 
vision for the country. In this thesis, I evaluate a proposed approach to achieving such a 
vision—something I call the “Resource Network Strategy.” In this approach, Afghan and 
Coalition efforts to develop the country’s considerable natural resource endowment are 
integrated with the U.S. Special Operations Forces continuing village stability operations 
in a way that establishes a sustainable long-term counterinsurgency effort that will defeat 
the enemy at the village level while securing the support of Afghanistan’s central 
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I. OVERVIEW: A RESOURCE NETWORK-BASED 
COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN 
In this thesis, I propose and evaluate the potential efficacy of a new 
counterinsurgency strategy that leverages the economic potential embodied in 
Afghanistan’s natural resources and the unique operational capabilities of United States 
Special Operations Forces (USSOF).  The central goal of this new strategy is to establish 
a sustainable long-term counterinsurgency effort that will defeat the enemy at the local 
village level while securing the support of Afghanistan’s central government and 
minimizing the human and financial costs to the United States and its allies.   
While implementation of the proposed strategy involves many “moving parts,” 
the idea is conceptually simple.  I am proposing that the USSOF, which currently 
conducts village stability operations (VSO) in roughly 100 villages throughout 
Afghanistan, position its assets to sites that will secure access to that country’s natural 
resource wealth.  Following the strategic shift of the VSO network, USSOF and its 
associated Afghan forces, the Afghan local police (ALP), would then implement policies 
aimed at enabling the local population to conduct small-scale mining activities, while, at 
the same time, the Afghan government, with assistance from USAID, would take 
advantage of the enhanced security environment in these areas to develop the 
infrastructure and legal processes needed to commence responsible large-scale 
commercial mining. 
What would such an effort achieve?  First, it would drive a wedge between the 
majority of the Afghan people and hardcore insurgents formally affiliated with the 
Taliban, the Haqqani network, and al Qaeda.  The “silent majority” of villagers, who 
reject insurgent ideology but tolerate the local presence of the insurgents because they 
have little to gain and much to lose should they confront them, would have a good reason 
to stand up and make their voices heard.  They are likely to be joined in this resistance to 
the enemy by many of the less “hardline” insurgents—often “accidental guerrillas”1 who 
                                                 
1 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009).  
 2 
are motivated by personal issues or tribal rivalries to side with the insurgents.  They will 
now have economic options more attractive than participating in the fighting.  Second, 
such an approach would create a positive dynamic of growing economic contact and 
interdependence between rural Afghanistan, its urban centers, and the central 
government.  This contact will engender the social, cultural, and economic change that 
would allow Afghanistan to “knit” itself together into a more coherent country, a 
requirement if the campaign in Afghanistan is to succeed in the long term.  Finally, such 
a strategy would require a bare minimum of American troops and would largely be self-
financing since the economic dimension of the effort would involve development efforts 
financed by revenue from mining rather than foreign aid.  Hence, it would be credible for 
the US to make a long-term commitment to such a strategy, even in the face of 
considerable domestic war weariness. 
Decision makers will not adopt a strategy because its author makes claims about 
how well it would work.  First, it must be established that the proposal is feasible and can 
actually be implemented.  Second, there must be reason to believe that the strategy will 
work as described.   
Let us first consider the question of implementation.  The proposal requires two 
elements.  The first is a working USSOF program of local counterinsurgency.  The 
second is the presence of a meaningful and accessible natural resource endowment in 
Afghanistan.  Both of these elements are in place.   
Since 2009, USSOF elements have been embedded in numerous villages 
throughout Afghanistan, conducting village stability operations (VSO).  VSO efforts are 
based on a number of elements, including (i) enablement of local governance; (ii) 
recruitment and training of home-grown security forces that are collectively known as the 
Afghan local police (ALP); and (iii) goodwill efforts and micro-level socio-economic 
development efforts.  The closest analogue to the USSOF’s VSO effort is the Vietnam-
 3 
era Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), a Special Forces program widely regarded 
as one of the important American successes during the Indochina conflict.2   
Currently (fall 2013), USSOF elements are embedded in over 90 Afghan villages, 
recruiting, training, and advising ALP forces.3  These activities are relatively evenly 
distributed throughout Afghanistan, and are usually located in the vicinity of the 
country’s “Ring Road” and larger population centers.  In addition, 136 Afghan districts 
are authorized these security forces, and 84 (62 percent) of these districts have 
operational ALP forces.4  Figure 1 illustrates the location of the 12,900+ ALP by district 
in Afghanistan as of March, 2012.5  By July 2013, these numbers had increased to 
~22,000, but there are no maps that are currently available to illustrate their disposition.6   
It is important to note that USSOF forces establish a VSO site only if they are 
accepted by the local community.  Hence, a major element of the program is to build 
networks of trust and understanding prior to establishment of a VSO site.  Later, the 
USSOF element focuses on deepening its ties with the village in which it physically 
embedded while developing new relationships or connections with Afghans in 
neighboring villages and districts.  These USSOF elements are small (12–30 personnel), 
travel light (often by foot or horseback), and require minimal logistical support since they 
generally buy food and supplies in local markets.  
                                                 
2 Mark L. Brown highlights numerous similarities between VSO in Afghanistan and the Vietnam era 
CIDG approach by the U.S. Army Special Forces in “Village Stability Operations: An Historical 
Perspective from Vietnam to Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal (March 2013), accessed July 26, 2013, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/village-stability-operations-an-historical-perspective-from-vietnam-to-
afghanistan. 
3 Lisa Saum-Manning, “VSO/ALP: Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local 
Defense,” Working Paper WR936, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2012, accessed August 26, 
2013, http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR936, 9; ISAF source document, September 26, 2012.  
4 Lisa Saum-Manning, “VSO/ALP: Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local 
Defense,” Small Wars Journal (December 2012), accessed on August 26, 2013, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/vsoalp. 9. 
5 Lisa Saum-Manning illustrates the dispositions and amount of ALP that USSOF are recruiting, 
training, advising and assisting in Afghanistan in “VSO/ALP: Comparing Past and Current Challenges to 
Afghan Local Defense,” Small Wars Journal (December 2012), accessed on August 26, 2013, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/vsoalp.  
6 Saum-Manning, “VSO/ALP.” 
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Coalition military commanders generally regard the VSO program as highly 
successful, having noted the relatively good military performance of ALP units, the 
valuable intelligence that local villagers have provided, the decreases in insurgent 
activities typically after VSO sites are established, and the small resource burden that has 
been required to implement and sustain the program.  That said, VSO efforts have 
engendered some opposition in the Afghan government due to anxiety that ALP units 
may evolve into militias that exacerbate Afghan divisions rather than facilitate unified 
nation-building.  Such opposition must be addressed if VSO operations are to become the 
centerpiece of counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. 
 
Figure 1.  The Disposition and Number of ALP by District in Afghanistan7 
                                                 
7 Map 1 is a modification of the map illustrated in Saum-Manning’s 2012 article. The numbers of ALP 
listed (not illustrated) by district in Saum-Manning’s map are illustrated in Map 1 by color codes and 
district. Saum-Manning, “VSO/ALP.” 
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While USSOF have put in place the counterinsurgency capabilities required to 
implement the strategy proposed in this thesis, the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS) and its Afghan partners have been busy validating the scale of Afghanistan’s 
natural resource endowment.  To be sure, USGS scientists and other geologists had long 
suspected that Afghanistan was a country rich in natural resources and minerals.8  But 
until recently only limited efforts have been made to survey those resources using the 
modern resource assessment methodologies that have recently become available.9  To 
rectify this, the USGS began to conduct rigorous assessments of Afghanistan in 2006 and 
2007, using the pioneering but limited work that had been done by Soviet experts 
between the 1950s and 1985.10   
Based on the promising results of these preliminary efforts, the USGS and the 
Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) established a formal 
agreement with the Afghan government in 2009 to validate and accurately assess the 
potential for fuel and nonfuel natural resource exploitation in Afghanistan.  During this 
time period the USGS collected an immense amount of historical and earth sample data, 
and in 2011, the USGS and TFBSO published a report delineating 24 important areas of 
interest (AOIs) for resource exploitation, and 33 subareas within these AOIs.11  All of 
these AOIs (and their subareas) were selected as areas with the potential to support 
commercial mineral exploitation.  According to the USGS report, “these AOIs have 
existing outcropping mineralization with favorable geometries and simple metallurgical 
ore types; these parameters therefore may translate into lower capital costs, lower lead 
                                                 
8 Sh. Chmyriov Abdullah and V. I. Dronov (eds.), Geological Map of Afghanistan (in Russian 
language, 1977, Annex no. 1, Book 1), accessed on August 26, 2013, 
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/downloads/start.cfm?id=930; Stephen G. Peters et al., eds. Preliminary Non-Fuel 
Mineral Resource Assessment of Afghanistan 2007, Open File Report 2007–1214 (Afghanistan Project No. 
157) (Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey, 2007), 1–3.  
9 Stephen G. Peters et al., eds., Preliminary Non-Fuel Mineral Resource Assessment, vol. I– II, Open 
File Report 2007-1214 (USGS Afghanistan Project No. 157) (Reston, CA: U.S. Geological Survey, 2007), 
2.  
10 Ibid., 1. 
11 Stephen G. Peters et al., eds., Summaries of Important Area for Mineral Investment and Production 
Opportunities of Nonfuel Minerals in Afghanistan, vol. I–II, Open-File Report 2011–1204 (Afghanistan 
Project No. 199) (Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey, 2011), iii-33.  
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times, and short payback periods of future mineral development.”12 The general 
locations, or AOIs, of these natural resources and minerals are illustrated in Figure 2.   
The scale of the resources identified by the USGS/TFBSO study is breathtaking, 
with the gross aggregate value of Afghanistan’s natural resources estimated as being 
greater than $1 trillion.13  This has led to considerable international interest in the Afghan 
mining initiatives.14  As of May 13th, 2013, the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum 
had signed over 300 mining related agreements with local and foreign mining companies 
who are seeking to extract these resources.15  In spite of this, little actual progress has 
been made in the development of Afghanistan’s mining industry.  In addition to obvious 
problems such as security conditions and remote locations, all experts I contacted 
regarding mining in Afghanistan cited confusion about the Afghan Mining Law as being 
the largest barrier to continuing forward with larger-scale mining.16   
                                                 
12 Ibid., iv. 
13 Steve Kral, “Minerals Key to Afghanistan,” Mining Engineering 63, no. 4 (April, 2011): 136; 
Global Data Ltd., “Afghanistan’s Mining Industry on the Path of Development” (United Kingdom: 
London, October, 2012), accessed July 7, 2013, 
http://search.proquest.com.docview/1284703508?accountid=12702, 1.  
14 The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum website lists numerous 
articles of foreign investors who are exploring opportunities for mining in Afghanistan. For more 
information see http://mom.gov.af/en.  
15 Ministry of Mines and Petroleum website listed 313 mining related contracts at various stages of 
progress in Afghanistan. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, “Ministry of 
Mines and Petroleum,” accessed July 7, 2013, http://www.mom.gov.af.en. 
16 Emails and conversations with an anonymous source who is the 2013 TFBSO Director of 
Development; Michael Chornack a current USGS hydrologist and 2010–2012 member of the TFBSO; Bob 
Miller a miner, geologist and senior advisor for the TFBSO 2010–2012; Steve Peters a current USGS 
geologist and 2010–2012 member of the TFBSO; and Emily Scott-King the minerals project lead for the 
TFBSO from 2010–2012.  
 7 
 
Figure 2.  Map of USGS’s 24 AOIs.17 
While direct efforts to develop mining initiatives have bogged down, considerable 
progress has been made in efforts to develop the infrastructure required to facilitate 
mining.  Road infrastructure that supports the extraction and transportation of natural 
resources has been a top priority of USAID’s Afghanistan Infrastructure and 
Rehabilitation Project (IRP), which was launched in the summer of 2006.18  Between 
2002 and 2011, twenty-seven percent of USAID’s budget has been applied to road 
                                                 
17 The original multi-colors of the USGS’s map were modified to reflect just one color and its 
corresponding AOIs as they pertain to this thesis. Peters et al., eds., “Summaries,” v.  
18 The USAID in Afghanistan Infrastructure and Rehabilitation (IRP) website states that it was 
established to “support Afghanistan’s transition to a stable and economically sustainable society, its 
funding was provided by the American people through USAID, and the program was designed to support 
Afghanistan’s maturation toward its next phase of economic, social, and political development, which is 
intrinsically linked to: the availability of secure, reliable and affordable supplies and power; and the 
nation’s ability to provide safe and reliable transport systems allowing cost efficient and timely movement 
of goods and people.” U.S. Agency for International Development, “Overview,” Afghanistan Infrastructure 
and Rehabilitation Program, accessed on August 26, 2013, https://www.irp-af.com/?pname=overview. 
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construction and power projects in Afghanistan.19  As a result, the country’s 2,700 
kilometer “ring road” is nearly all trafficable, and the road’s 233-kilometer uncompleted 
stretch in the country’s northern region was funded for completion in 2011 by a $340 
million Asian Development Bank donation.20  USAID’s major infrastructure 
improvement goals in Afghanistan have only partially been met, but signs of 
infrastructure improvement are clearly visible on the ground.  Afghanistan’s “ring road,” 
primary, and secondary roads are illustrated on Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  Afghanistan’s Roads. 
                                                 
19 Afghanistan website published its total spending between 2002 and 2011. The value of 27 percent 
was calculated by adding the total amounts of funding USAID applied towards road construction and 
power projects between 2003–2011 and dividing that amount by the total amount of spending for the same 
years ($4,038 million/$15,165 million = 26.62 percent rounded to 27 percent), U.S. Agency for 
International Development, “2002–2011 Spending,” accessed on May 27, 2013, 
http://afghanistan.usaid/gov/en/about/budget. 
20 Asian Development Bank, “Asian Development Bank Provides $340 million to Complete Afghan 
Ring Road,” January 17, 2011, accessed on August 26, 2013, http://www.adb.org/news/adb-provides-340-
million-complete-afghan-ring-road. 
 9 
Not everyone sees Afghanistan’s large endowment of natural resources as a 
blessing.  A number of observers have argued that Afghanistan, given its low level of 
political cohesion and social development, is likely to fall victim to the “resource 
curse,”21 a set of socioeconomic pathologies associated with economically poor but 
resource-rich countries.  These include the potential for natural resource rents being 
monopolized by key leaders instead of supporting the country’s economic growth and 
development,22 the exacerbation of internal conflict, and a “tragedy of the commons.”23  
This tragedy could occur when the lands of Afghanistan are taken advantage of by 
individuals, without any limit, and no single individual (or group) having “official” claim 
to them as they use portions for their own benefits, stripping them of their value that 
should be shared by many individuals (or groups).  In the absence of regulation or private 
ownership, Afghanistan could potentially face a legacy of environmental degradation.24   
These are legitimate concerns that must be considered as Afghanistan proceeds 






                                                 
21 Richard Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis 
(London: Routledge, 1993), 1–10.  
22 Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, “Afghanistan and the ‘Resource Curse,” The Wall Street 
Journal, July 2, 2010, accessed August 26, 2013, 
https://iriss.stanford.edu/sites/all/files/sshp/docs/Haberpercent20andpercent20Menaldopercent20WSJ.pdf; 
“Oh Great, Another Congo,” Democracy in America: American Politics (blog), Economist, July 14, 2010, 
accessed on August 26, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/06/afghan_minerals; J. Edward Conway, 
“How Afghanistan Can Escape the Resource Curse,” Global Policy Forum, February 29, 2012, accessed 
August 26, 2013, http://www.globalpolicy.org/the-dark-side-of-natural-resources-st/other-articlesanalysis-
and-general-debate/51382-how-afghanistan-can-escape-the-resource-curse.html.  
23 Originally defined and discussed by Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 162 
(1968), 1243–1248.  
24 Ibid.  
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Petroleum is already negotiating agreements with foreign investors,25 and there are clear 
signs that problems involving transparency and access to natural resource rents have 
already occurred.26   
Fortunately, the Afghan government and partner nations are already trying to deal 
proactively with the challenges of transparency and corruption engendered by mining 
development.  For example, the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum—with the 
support of non-governmental organization (NGOs) and USAID—is addressing numerous 
legal aspects of mining,27 including the need to strengthen the property rights central to 
avoidance of the “tragedy of the commons.” 
Interestingly, a key aspect of Afghan exploitation of its mineral endowment that 
remains to be addressed is how the interests of local Afghan stakeholders will be 
safeguarded and incorporated into law. This leads to the second question raised above—
why is it likely that the combination of VSO efforts and mineral exploitation will produce 
a good strategic outcome?  To address this, let us first establish that, while formal mining 
efforts in Afghanistan are bogged down, villagers are busily engaged in small-scale 
artisanal mining throughout the country, and would be greatly impacted—for better for 
worse—as major mining initiatives commence.  
For example, Dr. Stephen Peters, lead author of the USGS report, explained to me 
in July, 2013: 
                                                 
25 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, “Ministry of Mines and 
Petroleum,” accessed August 26, 2013, http://www.mom.gov.af.en.  
26 Global Witness highlights the Aynak copper deal between China and the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan and “urges that the contract be published in line with Afghanistan’s commitment to 
transparency and the Chinese principles of ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘win-win cooperation.’” in “Copper 
Bottomed? Bolstering the Aynak Contract: Afghanistan’s First Major Mining Deal,” November 20, 2012, 
accessed on August 26, 2012, http://www.globalwitness.org/library/copper-bottomed-bolstering-aynak-
contract-afghanistanpercentE2percent80percent99s-first-major-mining-deal. This article, among several 
other internet postings of China’s involvement with signing deals to mine in Afghanistan, are not listed or 
addressed on Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum website. 
27 International Trade Commission, Mining in Afghanistan: Guide to Conducting Business and 
Ensuring Compliance (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 2008), accessed August 26, 2013, 
http://trade.gov/static/Minerals_Law_Guide_2008.pdf, 1; USAID Afghanistan, “Land Reform in 
Afghanistan,” accessed August 26, 2013, 
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/186/Land_Reform_in_Afghanistan_LARA. 
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Many Afghans are mining in Afghanistan now, but doing it by very 
rudimentary (placer and artisanal) means.28  Several Afghan villagers 
want to mine in a more official capacity, but when asking to do so, they’re 
told not to mine by members of the Afghan Central Government.  But, 
they do it anyway.29   
Dr. Peters forcefully argued that such small-scale efforts, rather than competing 
with more formal projects, are actually a necessary stage in the development of the 
Afghan mining industry, and that small-scale mining was being neglected by 
Afghanistan’s central government because of the lack of experienced mining 
professionals at the Ministry of Mines and the political disjunction between 
Afghanistan’s government and its rural population.  For that reason, he thought that 
USSOF could play a vital role in overall development of Afghanistan’s mining industry if 
it acted as the promoter and protector of the country’s small-scale mining sector.  
As I have discovered, such an attempt to leverage a VSO presence in order to 
facilitate artisanal mining has already taken place, and it appears to have been a major 
success.  Geologist and TFBSO member Bob Miller told me:  
In December 2010, members of the Task Force for Business (TFBSO) and 
Stability Operations approached key leaders from the Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) and the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum in Afghanistan.  
The TFBSO understood the extreme relevance behind the natural resource 
and mineral data produced and validated by the US Geological Survey 
during the few years prior.  Members of the TFBSO asked for access to 
the Afghan people in order to eventually enable mining, and all parties 
were completely in favor.  In July 2011, the TFBSO met with some SOF 
operators and one of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) Deputy Commanders 
that these forces had recruited, trained, and were advising in Khas Kunar 
District, Kunar Province, Afghanistan.  The ALP Commander was very 
knowledgeable about the locations of chromite in his district. According to 
                                                 
28 Afghan artisanal and placer mining methods involve numerous low technology extraction 
techniques, such as: using shovels, picks and axes for digging; using explosives extracted from unexploded 
ordinance to reduce heavily mineralized rock formations; and using old mining equipment, some of which 
is not intended for mining, to extract minerals from the earth. Additionally, artisanal and placer mining 
techniques often present very high risks to Afghan miners. These Afghan mining techniques were 
explained by Stephen G. Peters during a conversation with the author and Dr. Jonathan Lipow, University 
of Nevada-Reno, July 10–12, 2013 and Bob Miller, a TFBSO miner, geologist and advisor from 2010–
2012 via email and phone conversations with the author.  
29 Stephen G. Peters, comment on “Are the Afghan Locals Mining Now?” with author and Dr. 
Jonathan Lipow, University of Nevada-Reno, July 10–12, 2013.  
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a TFBSO member, he knew where 100 plus chromite mines (see Figure 4) 
were, and we validated 60 of them.  This ALP Deputy Commander had 
been conducting artisanal mining in the area for several years.  By October 
2011, Afghan locals from Kunar District were delivering (see Figure 4) 
chromite ore to forward operating base (FOB) Penich for crushing and 
separation with simple and effective equipment provided by the TFBSO.  
In December 2011, members of SOF and the TFBSO trained the locals to 
crush and separate chromite ore at FOB Penich.  In January 2012, the 
Afghans were on “cruise control,” processing their own chromite ore.  The 
word was spreading among the Afghans to bring their locally collected ore 
to FOB Penich for processing.  The TFBSO determined the ore to be of 
very high grade and best sold as direct shipping lump ore to obtain the 
highest prices. 
Behind the scenes, members of the TFBSO had reached out to a Swedish 
mineral processing company and discovered their immediate willingness 
to buy the Afghans’ chromite.  On January 14, 2012, members of the 
TFBSO and SOF conducted a ceremony at FOB Penich to transfer 
ownership of the crushing and separating equipment to Afghans.  
Surprisingly, approximately 60 Afghans from several heavily mineralized 
areas of eastern Afghanistan attended this ceremony.  All of these Afghans 
were asking the Americans to use their processing equipment, get more of 
it, and for it to be delivered to their villages.  A three-man group of group 
of miners from Nuristan Province stated, “We have enormous amounts of 
minerals. If you come to our village and help us, and our village becomes 
dangerous, we will leave our families with your people.  We’ll sacrifice 
my family to ensure your safety and success in helping us. Please come to 
our village.”  
The Afghans thus proved their intense desire to exploit, process, and sell 
their minerals.  Sadly, when Afghanistan’s Minister of Mines and 
Petroleum discovered that Afghan locals were actually delivering high-
grade chromite ore to FOB Penich, he considered it, “illegal” and ordered 
that it be stopped until the Afghan Mining Law is completed.  Today, the 
Afghans continue mining various ores and selling numerous minerals 
extra-legally.  Although most troubling, it is being shipped throughout the 
black markets, mostly to Pakistan with significant benefits to the 
Taliban.30  
I have spoken to Emily Scott-King (the project lead for this TFBSO activity), 
Michael Chornack31 (a USGS hydrologist that participated in and is very knowledgeable 
                                                 
30 Bob Miller (senior TFBSO advisor and geologist), phone conversation with author, 12 August 2012; 
Bob Miller, email to author, August 14, 2013. 
31 Michael P. Chornack, email message to author, August 13, 2013.  
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about this activity), and Dr. Stephen Peters (the lead author of the 2007 and 2011 USGS 
mineral reports).  All were familiar with the effort at FOB Penich and validated the story 
recounted above.  Miller also explained that, since the discontinuation of the activity at 
FOB Penich, “at best, the Afghans are being paid only 50–60 percent of what they should 
be making on (the sales of) their chromite,”32 while another TFBSO member stated that 
“the Afghans are only being paid about 25 percent of what they should be getting for 
these minerals.”33   
The experience at FOB Penich in Kunar Province illustrates the great potential 
embedded in the combination of VSO efforts and small scale mining development in 
Afghanistan (see Figure 4 to gain a visual perspective on the initiative).  It also 
demonstrates the dangers inherent in ignoring small-scale natural resource development.  
If the Afghan government and Coalition fail to promote and facilitate local-level informal 
mining activity, the Taliban would likely fill the vacuum and do so instead.  As a result, 
funds and support would flow to the enemy while the social networks based on economic 
activity that ought to be developing between Afghanistan’s rural areas and its central 
government and urban elite would instead develop between these villages and the 




                                                 
32 Miller, phone conversation. 
33 Conversation between TFBSO member and author, via Skype.com, response to the question, “Are 




Figure 4.  These pictures illustrate mining and processing efforts in early 2012, Khas 
Kunar District, Kunar Province, Afghanistan.  The top left is a chromite mining 
area in the district. The top right picture is of ALP members overseeing chromite 
ore processing at FOB Penich. The bottom left picture is of USSOF facilitating 
chromite ore processing at FOB Penich. The bottom right picture is of a TFBSO 
geologist assisting Afghans ore processing.34 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  Chapter II provides an exposition of 
Afghanistan’s people, religions, geography and economic and social development, their 
relevance, and how this strategy addresses them. Chapter III examines details of the 
natural and mineral resources that exist in each of Afghanistan’s 24 areas identified by 
the USGS and an explanation of each of their security situations.  Chapter IV utilizes 
basic economics principles while explaining the most fundamental and economically 
                                                 
34 Pictures received from Emily Scott-King and Bob Miller (previous TFBSO consultants) in an email 
to author on August 14, 2013. 
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based factor in this strategy’s success - “the rational peasant.”35  Applying this factor, an 
explanation is provided regarding small-scale mining being a necessary step towards 
large-scale mining, and how the introduction of large-scale mining has the potential to 
impact Afghanistan socially and economically, secure the country, and result in the 
insurgency being defeated.  Chapter V explores the overall concept, followed by details 
and implementation mechanics of the proposed resource network strategy (RNS) as the 
way forward in Afghanistan.  This chapter also addresses the impact this strategy will 
have on short and long-term local and national-level conditions in Afghanistan.  Chapter 
VI concludes this study, addressing possible obstacles to implementation of the strategy, 
and makes recommendations for the next steps required to make implementation of the 





                                                 
35 Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant: the Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979).  
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II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF AFGHANISTAN 
This chapter offers an overview of Afghanistan’s ethnicities and tribes, Islamic 
and other religions, geography, and important economic and social characteristics.  These 
aspects of Afghanistan are salient to implementation of the Resource Network Strategy 
being proposed in this thesis.  As these aspects are examined, their relevance to this 
strategy is explained, followed by how this strategy addresses and aims to positively 
affect them.  Undoubtedly, the personnel carrying out this strategy will be continuously 
reminded of the numerous and often challenging aspects of Afghanistan.   
A. ETHNICITIES AND TRIBES 
The Afghan people are drawn from a remarkably diverse collection of tribes and 
ethnicities.36  Afghans have maintained the most influential ability to impact their own 
future for centuries, and will certainly impact this Resource Network Strategy’s 
application.  Afghanistan’s population has been estimated to be about 31 million.37  The 
country is primarily composed of “5 major ethnic groups and dozens of minor ethnic 
groups and many of which have not been studied well.”38  The country’s largest groups 
include the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and Aimaqs, and smaller groups include 
the Turkmen, Baluchs, Nuristanis and Kirghiz (see Figure 5).39  The largest two of these 
ethnic groups are the Pashtuns (42 percent) and the Tajiks (27 percent).40  The majority 
of the country’s Pashtuns live in Afghanistan’s south-central regions (see Figure 5),  
 
                                                 
36 Mary Agnello and others, eds., “Afghanistan and Multiculturalism in Khaled Hosseini's Novels: 
Study of Place and Diversity,” Multicultural Education & Technology Journal 3, no. 2 (2009): 96–111, 
accessed July 24, 2013, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17504970910967546; Bahaudin Mujtaba, “Ethnic 
Diversity, Distrust and Corruption in Afghanistan,” Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International 
Journal 32, no. 3 (2013), 245–261, accessed July 24, 2013, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/EDI-12-2012-
0113. 
37 Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], “The World Factbook: Afghanistan,” 2013, accessed July 31, 
2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. 
38 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 23. 
39 CIA, “Afghanistan,” 2013. 
40 Ibid. 
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although pockets of them live in the northern regions.  Afghanistan’s exact population 
number is difficult to determine with high degrees of accuracy, and descriptions of its 
varying ethnicities are extremely subjective.  
An estimated 76 percent of the population resides in Afghanistan’s rural regions, 
while 24 percent live in urban centers.41  Fifty percent of the Afghans speak Dari (also 
called Afghan Persian) as their first tongue, 35 percent speak Pashto (or Pashtun), 11 
percent speak Turkic languages, and four percent speak minor languages such as Balochi 
and Pashai.  Many Afghans, however, are bilingual or multi-lingual, and they manage to 
communicate with each other.42    
Afghanistan’s ethno-linguistic communities are loosely conglomerated and “flatly 
networked,”43 as opposed to being hierarchically structured.  No one individual or entity 
speaks for the country, or for that matter, for any of its ethnic groups.   
                                                 
41 CIA, “Afghanistan,” 2013. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ashin Adib-Moghaddam suggests that Orwellian theory regarding Islamic cultures “has itself 
become instantly recognizable in modern media and political discourse as its description of a world of lies, 
propaganda and indoctrination. Its connotations seem to become even more sinister when it is used to 
identify, not direct and overt deceit, but the kind of ‘thought control’ that operates in advanced capitalist 
societies: more ciphered, clandestine, opaque, flatly networked, horizontal, penetrative, global and 
politically transcendent than that in the intensely vertical and vulgar top-down form indicted in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (1949) in “Speaking of Islam: An Orwellian Story,” Monthly Review (October, 2010), 
accessed August 13, 2013, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/aam31// 1010.  
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Figure 5.  Afghanistan’s Ethnic and Tribal Disposition and Breakdown.44 
B. ISLAM IN AFGHANISTAN 
This section aims to explain Islam in Afghanistan in order to promote a better 
understanding of the country and the effects of the religion.  Afghanistan’s primary 
religion—Islam, has the potential to affect this strategy’s execution.  Accordingly, the 
groups and individuals that perform this strategy will be required to remain keenly aware 
of Islam in Afghanistan, how its practices and ideologies will be affected by this strategy, 
and the converse, or how its practices and ideologies will affect this strategy.  And, if the 
practitioners of this strategy do not directly acknowledge the religion, they and (or) their 
parent nations will eventually feel the painful impact of the Afghans that rally in the 
name is Islam.  Islam, and its Afghan followers, must be better understood,  
 
                                                 
44 Jayshree Bajoria and Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” August, 2013, Council on 
Foreign Relations, accessed August 15, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551#.  
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acknowledged and respected during the execution of this strategy.  Islam is, and will 
remain, a permanent aspect of Afghanistan, even while it is practiced and acknowledged 
in several unique ways. 
Today, the attitudes of Muslims toward Americans in Afghanistan are diverse.  In 
some areas, the United States’ presence is accepted and embraced because of the services 
they provide, such as increased security, employment opportunities in the ALP, 
functioning wells and irrigation systems, better roads, and support of local governance.  
In other areas, the presence and intentions of the United States are highly doubted, 
heavily resisted by the insurgency, or simply ignored.  Generally, the attitudes of 
Afghanistan’s Islamic believers towards Americans are based-upon a very simple 
question, “What is in this for me?”  USSOF, backed by their VSO methodology and 
networks have positively answered this question for many Afghan locals and villages, 
including Islamic believers.  
Distinctive groups, individuals, or terms used in this section only generally, and 
do not precisely, represent Islamic practices in Afghanistan.  Furthermore, the following 
groups, individuals, and terms are not distinctive, as some may or may not be used 
together to describe Islam and other spiritual practices in the country.  
Islam was introduced to Afghans from Arabia in the seventh century A.D.,45 and 
is interpreted and practiced in many diverse ways.  Afghanistan has a handful of Hindus, 
Sikhs, Jews and Christians, but the majority of Afghans are Muslim; 80 percent are 
Sunni, and 19 percent are Shia.46  The religion of Islam saturates the lives of 
Afghanistan’s Muslim populations in various ways, and provides them with a set of 
emotional, intellectual, behavioral values, or codes.47  Numerous times throughout 
history, the various types of Afghan Islamic followers (Muslims) have rallied together 
during clashes between the country’s own tribes and villages and foreign invaders.  A 
                                                 
45 Nick B. Mills, Karzai: The Failing American Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 4.  
46 CIA, “Afghanistan;” Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 30.  
47 Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 30. 
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few examples of situations when the Afghans rallied and fought in the name of Islam 
include during their strong resistance against the British during the First Anglo-Afghan 
War from 1839–1842; during jihad movements (holy wars against “non-believers) 
against the Soviets in the 1980s and Americans after 9/11, and during engagements in 
battles between the Northern Alliance and Taliban before and after 9/11.  In each 
situation, many Afghan Muslims rallied in the name of Islam to expel or eliminate people 
they considered “non-believers.”  Nevertheless, the Islamic codes that drive Muslim 
behavior are based-on the Koran and Sunna,48 and have continued to provide the Afghan 
people with their only “source of legitimization based upon universal values.”49  
Numerous Islamic practices discussed herein most commonly occur in mosques, 
which are often located near the center point of Afghan villages, ethnic or tribal areas. 
The mosque is used for performing numerous activities, such as: religious rituals; 
meetings for locals to discuss problems and news; and often as a place where those 
passing through can find rest.  Those who practice Islam (umma) live closest to mosques, 
the next closest populations are those of other religions, and farthest away are the 
unbelievers (or atheists).  Each day five prayers are broadcast from mosques, meals are 
offered that culminate yearly at Ramadan, and time honored forms of language, gestures, 
and courtesies are given to Allah.   
As the head of mosques, mullahs oversee several Islamic practices in most of 
Afghanistan’s metropolitan, villages, tribal, and ethnic areas.  More specifically, they 
interpret Islam and oversee religious rituals such as daily and baptismal prayers, youth 
catechisms, religious education, marriages, burials, exorcisms and circumcisions.50  
Mullahs also commonly oversee and mediate area disputes, act as area spokesmen, and 
regulate activities such as medical care.  Mullahs are often chosen and known for their 
piety, wisdom, formal and/or informal education in Islamic tradition and Muslim laws 
                                                 
48 The Sunna are everything besides the Koran that came from God’s Messenger; explain and provide 
details for the laws found in the Koran; provides examples of application of these laws; and are a direct 
revelation from God, or decisions of the Messenger that were then confirmed by revelation. “What is the 
Sunnah? (Part 2 of 2): The Sunnah in Islamic Law,” last modified on October 4, 2009, 
http://www.islamreligion.com/articles/655/. 
49 Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 30. 
50 Ibid. 
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(fiqh),51 and in tribal areas most often come from families who have earlier provided 
them.52  Mullahs are not members of institutions, are less often linked to the area Islamic 
religious scholars (‘ulama or pir), and considered subordinate to them.  They are often 
employed by the village and collect taxes or donations for their support from area locals, 
although they commonly supplement their livelihood with income earned from their 
individual skills.53  The social status of Afghan mullahs is relatively low in tribal areas 
because of exclusion from tribal communities, and considered more esteemed in other 
areas where their families have a higher social status.  
Islam in Afghanistan does not have a single system of standards, and many of the 
country’s religious, tribal, and ethnic beliefs have opposed each other for centuries.  
Complicating matters are the often pre-Islamic customs, superstitions and “common 
laws” practices in the urban and rural areas.54  Numerous institutions and groups have 
developed as the result of these customs, superstitions and laws, and have few, if any, 
commonalities with tribal or Islamic laws.  
The social foundations of Afghan Islam exist in various forms, and most often 
coincide with the tribal or non-tribal, and rural or urban environments it is practiced in.  
Additionally, links between religion and the Afghan mindset depend on whether groups 
or individuals follow secular, ideological, traditional or reformist beliefs.55  Within each 
of these Afghan groups, religious expressions occur with their own individual subtleties 
and representations, and are highly dependent upon various interpretations and 
understanding of Islam.  
1. Popular Islam 
Popular Islam in Afghanistan is a common understanding of the religion, and does 
not adhere to the details and variations of Islamic beliefs and practices.  This type of 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 238.  
52 Ibid., 32.  




Islam provides structure for day-to-day life, is represented in the languages, and promotes 
the country’s most prominent Muslim cultural identity.56  The popular Islamic concept 
directs and promotes good, and an understanding that compliance with its beliefs will 
ensure prosperity and deter social injustice.57  Popular Islam is the religion’s most 
common denominator for all Muslim groups in Afghan society.58  
Today, Popular Islamists generally tolerate and accept the presence of Americans 
in Afghanistan.  Many of them understand that America’s intentions are positive for the 
country and they are not threatened by Western culture and beliefs.  During the 
implementation of this Resource Network Strategy, it is likely that Popular Islamists will 
embrace the economic, social, and political benefits that mining bring, because they will 
bring better lifestyles and livelihoods to many Afghans.   
2. Political Islam or Islamism in Afghanistan 
Afghan popular Islamic believers, if forced to act out (offensively or defensively) 
are better explained in the context of Political Islam, or Islamism.  More recently, 
Muslims have been required to adapt to a modern world of nation-states.59  As the result 
of these forced changes or adaptations, influential Muslim theorists,60 professors, and 
groups have become concerned about the effects nations outside of Afghanistan would 
have on the religious, political, social, economic and linguistic aspects of Afghan  
 
 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 30. 
57 Kristin Mendoza, “Islam and Islamism in Afghanistan,” Afghan Legal History Project, Harvard 
Law School, accessed September 21, 2013, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/alhp.html, 2. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 8.  
60 Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’ concluded that Islamic theorists such as the Egypt-based Sayyid Qutb, leader 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Pakistani Abu ‘Ala Mawdudu, leader of the Jamaat-e Islami, believed that 
in order to establish God’s sovereignty, it is the duty of Muslims to cut ties with societies that exist within 
states that are ignorant to Islam; Islamic political parties must be parties of God; Muslim states must be led 
by “Commanders of the Faithful;” and that justice be established through conformity with Sharia laws. 
Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 8. 
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society.61  These Muslim theorists have significantly influenced Islamists within 
Afghanistan for about 60 years.  Today, much of this influence is represented in 
Afghanistan’s insurgency.  
Political Islamists in Afghanistan, before experiencing the economic, social, and 
political benefits of mining, could resist the implementation of the Resource Network 
Strategy.  These Islamic believers have experienced “foreign invaders” in the past, and 
may react similarly to this strategy.  The opinions and actions of Political Islamists can be 
changed through participating in or supporting mining activities and experiencing their 
accompanying benefits.  In the past, insurgents have changed their behaviors when the 
benefits of supporting local initiatives have exceeded the benefits of supporting 
insurgencies.62 Furthermore, organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah have provided 
services and incentives for local populations that have heavily swayed the opinions, 
attitudes, and activities of insurgent groups and their supporting populations.63  Political 
Islamists can be influenced by mining-related benefits because these benefits have the 
potential to exceed any others they’ve experienced and received by being involved with 
the insurgency.  
3. Tribal Islam 
Afghanistan’s Islamic society is often, not always, divided among tribal and 
ethnic lines, and its tribal practices are often inherited from ancestors. The Pashtuns are 
the country’s largest tribal and ethnic group, who less often distinguish between 
variations in their internal tribal, ethnic and religious backgrounds. The Pashtuns’ 
ancestor, Qays, allegedly received the word of Islam directly from the Prophet 
                                                 
61 Ibid.  
62 The insurgency during the Huk Rebellion (1942–1945) lost its momentum when local land rights 
were addressed in favor of many Filipinos; during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) the MPLA’s 
insurgency lost its momentum when Chinese farming and land rights were enabled and supported by the 
government; and during the Anbar awakening (~2007), Iraq’s insurgent attacks greatly reduced, which 
could be due to better economic conditions in the country, and the increased value of the Iraqi Dinar.  
63 Jonathan Masters, “Hamas,” November 27, 2012, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 
November 18, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968; Meylani Cammett, “Habitat for Hezbollah,” 
Foreign Policy (August 2006), accessed November 5, 2013, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/08/16/habitat_for_hezbollah. 
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Mohammad, therefore the tribe considers their Muslim background as a permanent aspect 
of their tribal or ethnic ancestry.64  Accordingly, there is no definite line between Islam 
and the Pashtuns and other groups with the same type of Islamic beliefs in Afghanistan.  
The Pashtuns very commonly follow a legal system and practice of Islam referred to as 
the “Way of the Pashtunwali,” or Pashtunwali codes65 and the assembly (loya jirga).  
Pashtuns adhere to the aforementioned codes when they assemble to discuss these 
varying issues.  
The Pashtuns and their codes have been in direct opposition with other Muslim 
laws for centuries, and these differences have created differing social orders in 
Afghanistan.  The following examples provided in Figure 6 illustrate how the 
Pashtunwali codes and Sharia laws differ.  The Pashtunwali codes aim to achieve a 
balance within the tribe and are defined by it.66 
                                                 
64 Jon Anderson, “How Afghans Define Themselves in Relation to Islam,” in Revolutions and 
Rebellions in Afghanistan, ed. M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1984), 274.  
65 Bobbie Kalman and Erinn Banting list the Pashtunwali codes as: Melmastia, visitors are welcomed 
warmly; Nanawati, shelter and refuge are provided to people running from the law; Badal, the right to feud 
with families who harm them or a family member; Tureh, bravery must be demonstrated; Sabat, loyalty is 
given to one’s family, friends, and tribal members; Imandari, righteousness is given to people that behave 
in a moral way; Isteqamat, persistence in everything that people do, from their studies to their beliefs; 
Ghayrat, people have the right to defend their property, their individual and family’s honor; and Namus, 
men must defend women against danger at all costs. Bobbie Kalman and Erinn Banting, Afghanistan: The 
People (New York: Crabtree Publishing Company, 2003), 14.  
66 Ibid.  
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Figure 6.  Examples of differences between the Pashtunwali Codes and the Sharia laws. 
The Pashtuns will be heavily involved in the Resource Network Strategy from 
local to national levels.  Pashtuns encircle several of the natural and mineral resource-rich 
areas in Afghanistan, and they’re heavily involved in the country’s politics at all levels.  
Thus far, many Pashtuns, including President Karzai, have accepted America’s economic, 
social, and political support in many ways.  When exposed to the benefits of local 
artisanal mining, it is likely that the Pashtuns will embrace USSOF’s support of local 
mining initiatives.  Furthermore, the Pashtunwali codes offer a foundation for settling 
local disputes, which can become a factor when mining natural and mineral resources.  
Through this strategy, mining in Afghanistan is likely to be viewed positively and 
supported by the Pashtuns.  
4. Textual Islam  
In contrast to the Pashtuns, the Shari‘at are Afghans who follow what are 
commonly referred to as Sharia laws.  The Shari‘at usually do not recognize differences 
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between tribal and ethnic groups and desire a more widespread Islamic social mandate.  
The Shari‘at place themselves above specific groups, those in solidarity and those with 
social cohesion who are not followers of Sharia laws, imposing universal laws of the 
Muslim community bonded by religion.67  The general framework of penal and common 
laws in the non-tribal zones continues to be Sharia laws and have yet to be replaced by 
another formal or informal system.68  
If the Resource Network Strategy is advertised poorly or improperly, the 
followers of Textual Islam could view those implementing it with negative perceptions.  
For example, if this strategy is perceived as a “get rich quick” scheme, which it should 
not be, this type of Islamic following could consider this as an encroachment of 
capitalism and Western culture at the village level, and a threat to their beliefs.  
Accordingly, the mining of Afghanistan’s natural and mineral resources should be 
advertised as Afghans leveraging what Allah has provided in order to provide them with 
better lifestyles.  Very realistically, USSOF will be supporting the Afghans as they  
experience these divine gifts.  USSOF understand the importance of cultural and religious 
nuances such as this very well. 
5. Sufism 
Sufism is an inner (or esoteric) or mystical form of Islam.69  Some consider this 
Sufi ideology as a reoccurring phenomenon that came before the birth of Islam, existing 
outside the Islamic scope, and having simply grown with Islam.70  Sufism is primarily 
practiced in Afghanistan’s middle class societies that live in larger villages and the 
suburbs of more modern population centers such as Herat, Kabul, and the Kandahar 
region.71  Sufi followers believe that there are two forms of revelation to God: the first is  
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exoteric and second esoteric, and they focus on the later. Afghan Sufism is comprised of 
three orders: the Naqshabandiyya, Qadiriyya and Chestiyya, and many religious scholars 
(ulama) are involved with these orders.72 
Sufis will very likely accept the Resource Network Strategy, and those 
implementing it.  Sufis generally accept more modernized lifestyles, which is suggested 
by them living near areas that are more advanced with modern amenities.  There is high 
potential that they’ll appreciate the economic, social, and political growth that mining 
enables, and in some capacity, participate in it.   
6. Reformist Fundamentalism 
Afghanistan’s reformist fundamentalism movement has been active in the 
country’s politics since the late 1960s,73 and is plagued with several challenges.  
Numerous Afghan fundamentalist movements desire a return to what they consider a 
more valid, “righteous,” and original form and practice of Islam.  The significant problem 
is that few groups can agree as to what interpretation of Islam is most correct and 
appropriate to follow.  
Fundamentalists have had limited influence in Afghanistan when compared to 
other Muslim ideologists.  Their opinions of the personnel implementing this Resource 
Network Strategy will most likely be negative, but they may not matter, as they continue 
to be consumed with their own internal disputes regarding what version of Islam is 
appropriate to follow.  In addition to Afghanistan, Muslim fundamentalists in other 
countries continue to be influenced by capitalism, westerners, and other ideologies.  It is 
likely that Islamic fundamentalists, after witnessing the economic, social, and political 
benefits of mining, will be interested, support, or participate in mining.  
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Sunni Muslims primarily practice Deobandism in Afghanistan.  This type of 
Islamic practice was originally intended to bridge the gap between Sunni and Shia 
Muslims by promoting reasoning through the Koran and Sunna, and the strict teachings 
of the Hanafi fiqh or code of conduct that emphasizes the individual’s role of reason.74  
Deobandism has a great deal of influence in Afghanistan today, along with other types of 
Islam with similar roots.75 
Followers of Deobandism, many of which are members of the Taliban, may resist 
those implanting the Resource Network Strategy.  Deobandis have often resisted external 
influence in Afghanistan, which is shown through its participation in the insurgency.76  
Although, much like the believers of other variations of Islam, followers of Deobandism, 
after experiencing or witnessing the economic, social, and political benefits that mining 
offers, will likely be in favor of those implementing this Resource Network Strategy.  
Their “individual role of reason” has a high likelihood for motivating them to support or 
participate in activities such as mining, that increase their economic, social, and political 
capital.  
8. Wahhabism 
Wahhabism is distinguished by a total rejection of Sufism, opposition to Shias, 
and desire for a pure form of Islamic practices.  More specifically, Wahhabists think that 
Islamic society should be organized completely on religious terms, and not by political 
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weapons to flow into Afghanistan, have enabled the spread of Wahhabi influence in 
Afghanistan.  Today, during the post-9/11 era, Wahhabism continues to have influence in 
the country.78 
Initially, Wahhabists will likely resist the Resource Network Strategy and those 
implementing it.  It cannot be forgotten that Osama Bin Laden brought a lot of money 
and resources to Afghanistan in the late 1990s, and provided them to Wahhabists in trade 
for their support.  The Wahhabists proved their own ability to be influenced by the 
economic, social, and political benefits provided by Bin Laden.  Wahhabists have a high 
likelihood for eventually participating in, or at least supporting, mining activities in order 
to experience these same benefits.  It will just take time to gain their support of mining.  
Further indication that Wahhabists will eventually accept and participate in 
Afghan mining was provided in the Khas Kunar mining vignette described in Chapter I.  
Many Afghan miners that attending the USSOF-TFBSO transfer of mining equipment 
ceremony in January, 2012 (described in Chapter I), were from areas along the Afghan-
Pakistan border where Wahhabism is heavily practiced, and many of them wanted 
USSOF to assist them with mining in their villages.   
9. Shia and Sunni Groups 
Today’s Afghan Shia and Sunni beliefs and differences play a role in Afghan 
society and, in many cases, have resulted in civil conflicts.  These differences originate 
from the seventh century when Muslims were faced with determining the succession of 
Islam following the death of the Prophet Muhammad.  ‘Ali, cousin and son-in-law to the 
Prophet, was followed by Shia groups that supported him as the Prophet’s rightful 
successor.  After ‘Ali’s death, Shias considered his descendants as the rightful leaders of 
the Muslim community. Around the same time, Abu Baker also gained large Sunni 
Muslim followings who all opposed ‘Ali’s claims as being the rightful successor to the 
Prophet.  ‘Ali’s Shia followings and Abu Baker’s Sunni followings have disagreed on the 
rightful aspect of Muslim leadership since shortly after the Prophet’s death.  Shias believe 
that imams are unfailing and the vehicle through which God provides direction to the 
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people; Sunnis do not think that Muslim community leaders have divine power.  Despite 
these Shia-Sunni differences and group separations, both groups have split into numerous 
sectarian groups (such as Wahhabis), and have developed their own religious and legal 
interpretations of Islam.79 
Many of the aforementioned Islamic groups are comprised of either Sunnis or 
Shias, or both.  Some members of these groups will support the Resource Network 
Strategy and those implementing it, others will immediately resist anything related to it, 
but eventually many from each group will witness or experience the benefits of mining.  
When these economic, social, and political benefits are available to Sunnis and Shias, it is 
likely that they will all, or at least most of them, will in some way support this strategy.  
What Shia groups would want to survive on the very minimum, when their Sunni 
neighbors are experiencing increased mining-related benefits, and vice versa?  Likely 
none.  
10. Pan-Islamism 
Pan-Islamism is a political movement that strives to achieve a unified Islamic 
state, or Caliphate.  Followers of this type of Islam consider Muslim societies to be 
threatened by Western influence, and intend to unify and mobilize Muslims to resist it.  
More specifically, they believe Sharia laws to be extremely important and valid, do not 
accept the adoption of Western (mostly European) style courts and laws, and promote an 
Islamic resurgence to enforce their own laws.80  Despite the ideologies of Pan-Islamism, 
its followers have not established a strong foundation in Afghanistan, but in some 
instances, are represented in groups discussed herein.   
Pan-Islamists will likely, but only initially, not support the Resource Network 
Strategy, and those implementing it, mostly because non-Afghans will be involved.   
Although, much like the other Muslim groups, the economic, social, and political benefits 
related to mining will override negativity toward this strategy and the people involved.  
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Afghanistan’s numerous ethnicities and tribes, and variations of Islam, are 
relevant to this Resources Network Strategy.  The country’s people and Islamic 
ideologies must be understood, acknowledged, and respected as this strategy is moved 
forward.  Many non-Muslims have known about Islam for a long time.  Far fewer have 
effectively acknowledged the religion.  And only a relative few have respected Islam 
throughout Afghanistan’s history.   
This Resource Network Strategy is designed to embrace understanding and 
respect for all Afghans while simultaneously providing them with the progressive and 
common purpose of mining.  This purpose enables economic, social and political growth 
throughout the entire country.  This strategy recommends that USSOF shift their VSO 
methodology and influence towards Afghanistan’s natural and mineral resource-rich 
terrain in order to enable local Afghan mining.  This highly valued terrain is relatively 
evenly distributed throughout most portions of Afghanistan and has the potential to 
benefit numerous tribes, ethnicities, and Islamic believers, no matter their beliefs and 
ideologies.  
Afghans have always resisted being controlled by a central power because they’ve 
rarely, if ever, benefitted from one.  The benefits that various Afghan religious, social and 
political groups desire are themselves diverse.  Afghans require a reason, desire and 
overall benefit to actively pursue their own development and advancement, which cannot 
be forced upon them as many have tried to do in the past.  Surely, any leader that 
attempts to centrally control Afghanistan will have allegiances to some form of Islam, 
tribe, ethnicity, or special interest, either actively or passively, and opposing groups will 
likely experience no benefits, increasing costs, and then resist.  The various Afghan 
ethnicities, tribes, and believers—Muslims, require a way forward that enables them to 
make decisions for themselves while benefiting, one area at a time. 
The Resource Network Strategy is founded upon a very basic USSOF-led 
approach, which includes enabling Afghan mining in order to benefit each of their highly 
diverse groups.  This would start with those living throughout the country’s periphery and 
moving inward as opposed from Kabul and outward.  It would ensure the benefits of 
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many more Afghans exceed the costs they’ve experienced for many years.  This approach 
has the potential to achieve positive and lasting effects for many Afghans.     
Islam is the most common aspect of Afghanistan, but not all Afghans are “hard 
core” followers of the religion. Some Afghans do not faithfully acknowledge Islam at all.  
A similar reality was shown by British colonialists behavior while abroad.  Many, but not 
all were Christians.  Secular desires have quickly taken the place of religious ones for 
both Afghans and colonialists.  The concepts of “true believers” in any religion are often 
times less real than perceived, because they are comprised by human tendencies.  
This Resource Network Strategy addresses the human aspects of all Afghans by 
enabling them to benefit economically, socially, and politically through mining.  To 
enable these Afghan benefits, USSOF-led elements will utilize their various networks to 
influence and increase local knowledge, resources, capabilities, and motivations required 
to conduct mining.   
C. GEOGRAPHY 
Afghanistan is a landlocked central Asian country bordered by Iran to the West; 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the North; China to the Northeast; and 
Pakistan to the East and South.  It is roughly the same size as the U.S. state of Texas.81  
The country is divided into 34 provinces (Daykundi and Panjsher were added in 2005) 
and 398 districts.  Afghanistan’s provinces and districts often are referred to as 
administrative areas.   
Afghanistan is located on the “silk road” that connected the trade routes between 
China, Europe and India, and the resultant foreign interest in Afghanistan has heavily 
influenced the country’s geopolitics.  Foreign powers such as Britain, Russia, and the 
United States have all heavily influenced the delineation of modern Afghanistan’s 
borders at the national, provincial and district levels.82  Most (particularly rural) residents 
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of Afghanistan and neighboring countries pay little attention to these administrative 
borders because they’ve had very little input regarding where, when, and why these 
borders were established.  As a result, Afghanistan’s borders are extremely porous (see 
Figure 7 for an illustration of these borders).  
Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, is by far the largest city in the country with an 
estimated population (est. pop.) of 3,290,000.  Other key population centers include: 
Kandahar (est. pop. 490,000), Herat (est. pop. 435,000), Mazar-i-Shari (est. pop. 
368,000), Kunduz (est. pop. 305,000), Taloqan (est. pop. 209,000), Jalalabad (est. pop. 
207,000), and Puli Kumri (est. pop. 204,000).83   
 
Figure 7.  Afghanistan’s Administrative Boundaries, Key Population Centers and 
Capital. 
Afghanistan’s terrain and climate is extremely diverse.  The country is composed 
of several plains in its northern, western and southwestern regions, with varying degrees 
                                                 
83 Central Statistics Office, “Table 2-2: Settled Population (of Afghanistan) by Province-2010-2011,” 
2010–2011, accessed October 5, 2013, www.cso.gov. 
 35 
of rugged mountainous terrain in its central, northeastern and eastern portions.  More 
specifically, some of the country’s regions offer barren and high temperature deserts; 
freezing cold and snowcapped mountain peaks; wet and highly fertile river valleys; and 
rolling hills of both sparse and lush vegetation.   
The Hindu Kush Mountains are the country’s tallest (>4,000 m above sea level—
ASL) and most unforgiving terrain, and they blanket two thirds of the country.  Other 
significant terrain features include the Chagai Hills of southern Helmand Province; 
Registan Desert in the country’s southern regions; and the Argandab, Dori, Harut, 
Helmand, Khash and Tarnak Rivers that generally run from the southwest to northeast.  
Figure 8 illustrates the aforementioned information.  
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Figure 8.  Afghanistan’s terrain from sea level to >4,000 meters ASL.84  
In the context of the Resources Network Strategy, Afghanistan’s population and 
physical terrain are extremely relevant.  USSOF-enabled mining at the village level will 
eventually require the natural and mineral resources that are extracted to be transported to  
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another location in Afghanistan for further processing, trade, and investment.  
Additionally, more equipment will be required to be transported to areas where mining 
occurs.   
Afghans have been traversing the country’s challenging terrain for centuries, and 
many of them are experts at navigating it.  In some instances where terrain is challenging, 
USSOF will be required to acquire local Afghan knowledge of terrain and transport 
methods to transfer the natural and mineral resources that are mined.  In other places 
where terrain is too challenging to maneuver large equipment carrying mineral ore and 
other mining equipment, USSOF may be required to enable or assist in the transfer of 
mining-related products from one location to another by aircraft or vehicles not readily 
available to the Afghans.   
This strategy will require members of the Afghan government, USSOF, USAID, 
DoS and other civilian organizations to interact with foreign investors, financial 
institutions, and other countries while trading Afghanistan’s natural and mineral 
resources.  Accordingly, the Afghan government will be provided with an excellent 
opportunity to increase its political legitimacy and economic standing, and a more official 
interdependence will be established between the Afghans and their neighboring and other 
foreign partners.  
The transport of Afghanistan’s natural and mineral resources has potential to 
create a whole new industry in itself.  Movement of these resources will require many 
different types of transportation such as trucks, aircraft, mules, and horses, and all the 
resources required to make them move (fuel, oil, tires, food, saddles, etc.).    
USSOF will promote and reinforce the Afghans using their own indigenous 
methods of transport in order to develop and grow industries that support mining.  
USSOF understand the importance of indigenous forces and populations completing tasks 
on their own in order to promote long-term skills and capacities.  This Resource Network 
Strategy enables mining and its related tasks, and is not designed for USSOF to complete 
them.   
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D. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Afghanistan ranks as one of the poorest, least developed, and most corrupt85 
countries in the world.  Although the country’s economy has made improvements since 
the fall of the Taliban in 2001, most of this is credited to the billions of dollars it has 
received in international aid.  These improvements are seen by growth in their service 
and agricultural sectors.86  Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at 
$19.91 billion (official exchange rate) in 2012, ranking the country 109th in the world; 
and its GDP per capita was estimated at $1,100 in 2012, ranking the country 216th in the 
world.87  
1. Industries and Labor Force 
Afghanistan’s primary industries include the small-scale production of bricks, 
textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, apparel, food products, non-alcoholic beverages, 
mineral water, cement, natural gas, coal, and copper.  In 2011, the United Nations 
estimated 15.7 percent of the adult female and 80.3 percent of the adult male populations 
as participating in the Afghan labor force.88  
2. Exports, Imports and Trade Partners 
Afghanistan’s exports are mostly produced from small-scale businesses, as very 
few larger-scale corporations and companies exist there.  In 2012, the country’s exports 
were valued at $376 million, and were mostly comprised of opium, fruits and nuts, hand-
woven carpets, wool, cotton, hides and pelts, precious and semi-precious gems.89  The 
Afghans trade 33.1 percent of their exports with Pakistan, 24.9 percent with India, 8.7 
percent with Tajikistan, and 5.8 percent with the United States.90   
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Afghans rely heavily upon imports, although they receive them in relatively small 
amounts.  The country’s imports, valued at $6.39 billion in 2012 (117th in the world), 
were mostly machinery and other capital goods such as food, textiles, and petroleum 
products.91 Afghanistan receives 25.8 percent of its imports from Pakistan, 17.4 percent 
from the United States, 8.4 percent from Russia, 5.5 percent from India, 5.4 percent from 
China, 4.5 percent from Kazakhstan, and 4.3 percent from Germany.92 Undoubtedly, the 
Afghans are taking much more than they’re producing.  
3. The Afghan Poppy Harvest 
The Afghan poppy harvests greatly influence the country’s economy.  A May, 
2013 report published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan offered the following data: the Afghans were the world’s largest 
producers of opium from 2004 through 2012;93 in 2012, the total area of poppy 
cultivation was estimated at 154,000 hectares (380,542 acres), an 18 percent increase 
from 2011.  The country’s 2012 net opium exports equaled 10 percent of the country’s 
legal GDP, while the farm-gate value (value of opium leaving cultivation areas for 
eventual export) was estimated at four percent of the legal GDP.  The majority (95 
percent) of opium production occurred in nine provinces located in Afghanistan’s 
Southern and Western regions; the gross export value of (illicit) opium and 
heroin/morphine exports in 2012 was modestly estimated at $2 billion while the net 
export value of opiates was $1.94 billion.  Cannabis is closely related to poppy 
cultivation; 71 percent of poppy-growing villages reported cannabis cultivation in 
2012.94   
Why is Afghanistan’s economy relevant to the Resource Network Strategy?  This 
strategy aims to better the country’s economy through mining and the numerous other 
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industries that support it.  The country’s natural and mineral resources have the potential 
to positively affect Afghanistan’s economy beyond any of its other resources.   
How does the Resource Network Strategy address Afghanistan’s economy?  This 
strategy employs Afghan locals for mining and its related activities; provides them with 
financial resources (microloans, grants, banking, etc.) to enable mining; and facilitates 
direct payments from investors to the Afghans for natural and mineral resources that are 
mined.  This type of financial-based system will be enabled by USSOF, USAID, and DoS 
who will work to ensure their incentives are provided directly to Afghan miners.   
This strategy creates economic interdependence and moves resources between 
Afghanistan’s tribes and communities; foreign investors, other countries and financial 
institutions.  This interdependence will be established through the Afghans’ increased 
desires to benefit from trading their natural and mineral resources, purchase mining 
equipment, access and develop more advanced mining-related knowledge, and increase 
their support systems related to mining.   
E. AFGHAN EDUCATION 
In 2002, the Afghan central government, with support from UNESCO (and the 
Independent High Commission of Education), proposed to revitalize policies, objectives 
and strategies for education.  Afghanistan’s Ministry of Education, support by UNESCO 
and other International organizations, developed strategic plans for the improvement of 
primary, secondary, vocational, and higher education.  Significant attention was given to 
teacher training and higher education.  The Afghan Constitution, adopted in 2004, 
required nine years of basic education for all boys and girls between ages six and 15.  








vocational, and other higher education; establish free enrollment in state sponsored 
schools up to the university level; and allow and regulate private general, technical, 
vocational and higher education.95  
The results of Afghanistan’s educational initiatives between 2002 and 2012 have 
resulted in enrollment in general education increasing from 2.3 to 8.6 million, 3.2 million 
(38 percent) of which were females; and enrollment in higher education increasing from 
31,200 to 101,000 students, 19,200 (19 percent) of which were female students.  In spite 
of the expansion of education in Afghanistan, in 2012 only 58 percent of school age 
children (70 percent boys and 45 percent girls) participated in basic education.  Most of 
this low attendance is due to security, financial, and educational service constraints.96  
After 9/11, education in Afghanistan undoubtedly changed.  All levels and type of 
education expanded; male and females were given increased access to numerous types of 
education; and more Afghans have received formal education.  As Afghan education has 
made quantifiable improvements, the quality and efficiency of education continues to 
struggle in areas such as the quality and amount of available teachers and faculty, lack of  
adequate physical and learning facilities such as libraries and laboratories, and outdated 
and unsuitable curricula, especially for vocational and higher educations.  The country 
lacks a comprehensive strategy for science and technology education, and vocational 
training.  Furthermore, the literacy rate, 28.1 percent, remains low for Afghans 15 years 
of age and over;97 and it is unlikely that mandatory education for seven- through 12-year-
olds will be achieved before 2020.98  
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Why is education in Afghanistan relevant to the Resource Network Strategy?  
This strategy provides Afghans with several reasons or benefits for receiving education, 
and creates and supports education opportunities that far exceed any they’ve had in recent 
history.   
How does this strategy promote education at the village level?  The Resource 
Network Strategy promotes learning by: involving members of the Afghan Geological 
Survey, USGS, USAID, DoS, and USSOF; establishes internet cafés; and increases 
cellular networks and the number “smart” (cell) phones at the village level. This will 
provide access to information that is required in order to conduct efficient and effective 
mining and its related skills.  
Once Afghans are exposed to the benefits of increased mining-related knowledge, 
it is likely that villages and communities will increase their desire to educate themselves 
about mining, and will send their people to receive education at Afghanistan’s 
universities.  There is a high likelihood that Afghans will rely on “outsiders” mining-
related knowledge for only limited periods of time.  
F. AFGHAN HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS 
Afghanistan’s health care system is among the weakest in the world.  Afghans 
struggle to obtain the basic necessities such as food, shelter, and clothing.  Exposure to 
pneumonia, bacterial diarrhea, birth asphyxia, neonatal sepsis, hepatitis A, typhoid fever, 
malaria, the highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza, and other illnesses, diseases and 
injuries intensify the already poor health system.99  While foreign health care workers 
have increased since 9/11, there is a critical shortage of Afghan health care workers at 
every level.  Healthcare facilities are few and far between, and the ones that do exist are 
in need of restoration.  Furthermore, medicines, vaccines, and medical related equipment 
and materials are in short supply.   
Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) has a mission to “improve the 
health and nutritional status of the people of Afghanistan in an equitable and sustainable 
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manner through quality health services provision, advocating for the development of 
healthy environments and living conditions; and the promotion of healthy lifestyles.”100  
The MoPH has established numerous objectives to accomplish its mission. Additionally, 
many “international and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have assumed 
responsibility for the provisions of essential primary health-care services via direct 
contracts with donor agencies,” securing millions of dollars to support the Afghan 
healthcare system.101  While the MoPH, and international and national NGOs have all 
committed a great deal of time, monetary aid, and planning for better healthcare services, 
much more financial and human capital will be required to increase the health status of 
Afghans.  
Why do Afghan health and health care systems matter in the context of this 
strategy?  This Resource Network Strategy promotes mining and its related activities.  
Accordingly, Afghans will require increased medical skills, knowledge, and support at 
the village level because they’ll likely experience injuries and illnesses related to mining.   
How does this strategy intend to address Afghan health and health care systems?  
USSOF VSO teams have medics that are highly prepared to treat Afghan locals, and to 
train them to treat themselves for injuries and illnesses.  USSOF medics have been 
treating Afghan locals and training them to provide medical care in numerous villages for 
over a decade, and will continue to do so.  These types of activities by USSOF at the 
village level are major “rapport builders” among indigenous populations.   
Afghans at local and national levels understand that mining is dangerous, and that 
the likelihood of injuries and illnesses will increase when mining increases.  As Afghans 
start to experience benefits from mining, they’ll very likely increase their efforts to  
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educate themselves to treat injuries and illnesses. Afghans will seek medical-related 
educations and skills at Afghanistan’s vocational schools, colleges, and universities in 
order to support a mining industry.   
This strategy promotes the Afghan government’s support of mining at the village 
level.  It is very likely that when the Afghan government starts to experience economic, 
social, and political benefits from mining, it will increase its efforts to provide nurses, 
doctors, and medical services and supplies to mining communities.  Support such as this 
at the local levels by the Afghan government will increase its legitimacy in the eyes of 
many local populations, and in turn, increase its revenue through increased mining.  
G. AFGHAN CORRUPTION 
Corruption102 is a significant and well-known aspect of Afghanistan.103  The 
result of 6,700 Afghan surveys conducted in 2009 and 2011/2012 by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan High 
Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption determined corruption to be the largest issue of 
importance for their country, ahead of insecurity, unemployment, poverty/low standard of 
living, external influence, and government performance.104  
The large-scale population survey and four sector-specific (police, local 
government, judiciary and education) integrity surveys of public officials conducted by 
the UNODC and Afghan government in 2011/2012 revealed that the delivery of public 
services “remains severely affected by bribery in Afghanistan and that bribery has a 
major impact on the country’s economy.”  In 2012, half of Afghans surveyed paid bribes 
during requests for public services and the cost of bribes paid to government officials was  
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estimated at $3.9 billion.  This data collected in 2012 demonstrates a 40 percent increase 
between 2009 and 2012, as the ratio of bribery costs to GDP remained relatively 
consistent: 23 percent in 2009 and 20 percent in 2012.105 
Bribery undoubtedly affects the public sector, but also private entities in 
Afghanistan.  Almost 30 percent of Afghan citizens paid bribes when requesting services 
from individuals in the private sector in 2012, as opposed to 50 percent who paid bribes 
to public officials (or government employees).  The impact of bribery with non-public (or 
private entities) is lower, with an estimated total cost being $600 million per year, which 
is 15 percent of the estimated $3.9 billion paid to the public sector.106 
In 2011/2012, one out of every five (20 percent) Afghan citizens refused to pay a 
bribe, which was primarily due to their lack of financial resources.  The use of bribery in 
the public sector affects the ability of Afghan populations to access necessary services. 
People with higher incomes have better access to, and receive higher quality public 
services.  Conversely, Afghans surveyed with lower incomes were more likely to deny 
requests for bribes, making them less likely to utilize public services.107 
Public sector employment is largely based-on bribes or patronage.  Eighty percent 
(80 percent) of Afghans surveyed with family members employed in civil services 
between 2010 and 2012 declared that these family members received some form of 
assistance or paid a bribe to be recruited.  Civil servants surveyed in the police, local 
government, judiciary and education sectors acknowledged that (mostly monetary) 
assistance with recruitment was very common.  For example, 50 percent of police, local 
government staff and school teachers suggested that they’d received assistance in 
attaining their positions.108 
Twenty-two percent of people surveyed that paid a bribe in 2012 reported the 
incident to authorities (police—33 percent and the public prosecutor’s office and the 
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High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption—20 percent).  Bribery reporting in 
Afghanistan seemed to be high, but it is not clear if reporting described in the survey took 
place in a formal setting since it seldom led to effective intervention.  Less than 20 
percent of cases reported to authorities resulted in formal legal procedures and most 
claims did not result in any type of follow up.109 
In addition to the UNODC and Afghan government, several other organizations, 
such as Transparency International, the World Bank and Asia Foundation, the Center for 
International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), and 
Transparency International, have studied corruption in Afghanistan.110 All of them have 
indicated high levels of corruption in Afghanistan.  The effects of corruption were echoed 
in a January, 2009 statement by President Hamid Karzai, when he told BBC News that 
corruption affects the Afghan government and international organizations, aid agencies 
and private firms involved in reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.111 
During President Karzai’s administration (2004 to the present), several Afghan 
anti-corruption groups have formed, and they have had various focuses. Several 
organizations represent the Afghan government’s efforts to fight corruption in the 
country.  The High Office of Oversight and Anti-corruption (est. 2008) reports directly to 
Karzai, and coordinates and monitors the implementation of preventive measures, 
including the anti-corruption strategy, to help limit government corruption. 
The Control and Audit Office (est. 1981) reports directly to Karzai, and audits 
financial matters of the Afghan government.  The Anti-Corruption Unity (est. 2009) 
reports to the Afghan Attorney General, and prosecutes corruption cases.  The Major 
Crimes Task Force (est. 2009) reports to the Deputy Minister of Security and Director of 
the Security General, and investigates high-level corruption cases.  The Criminal Justice 
Task Force (est. 2005) reports to the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, Prosecutors  
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and Central Narcotics Tribunal (Supreme Court), and investigates and prosecutes drug-
related crimes and corruption.112  The mission of these organizations is clear, but, 
corruption continues to be a major problem in the country. 
Why is Afghan corruption relevant in the context of the Resource Network 
Strategy?  The personnel implementing this strategy will be surrounded by corruption on 
a daily basis, and must be willing to accept some degrees of it.  How does the Resource 
Network Strategy address corruption?  An overarching theme that exists throughout 
Afghanistan’s corrupt practices is the competition for services and resources between 
urban and rural Afghans.  The Resource Network Strategy is designed to enable 
economic, social, and political capital, growth, and leverage at the Afghan village level 
through mining.  The more efforts Afghans invest in USSOF-enabled mining, the more 
financial resources, social services, and legitimacy local leaders and communities will 
have.  
This strategy is designed to reinforce the Afghan government’s support of village 
level mining.  The government’s support of mining conducted by Afghan locals provides 
it with significant opportunities for its increased legitimacy, which could make corruption 
less of a concern in the minds of many Afghans. Furthermore, this strategy requires 
Afghan leaders to reach out to the international mining community to increase its mining 
capacity and investors to trade its natural and mineral resources.  The Afghan 
government’s ability to deliver natural and mineral resources to foreign investors, while 
simultaneously ensuring Afghan mining communities are supported and receive 
payments for their efforts and resources, provides it with an excellent opportunity for 
increasing its legitimacy from multiple perspectives.   
Afghanistan’s people, beliefs, terrain, and economic and social situations are 
unique and diverse.  Understanding these issues is often frustrating.  Those who 
implement this Resource Network Strategy will be surrounded by all of these aspects of 
Afghan culture, society, and terrain.  This strategy has the potential to positively 
influence many, if not all, of the aforementioned aspects of Afghanistan. This strategy is 
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designed to increase economic, social, and political capital, with mining being the 
primary impetus, for many Afghan communities, starting from the country’s periphery 
and moving inwards.  The natural and mineral resources have the potential to exceed the 
economic effects and benefits of legal and illegal drug production and trade.  This 
strategy aims to provide mining-related knowledge, skills, and educations directly to the 
Afghans at the village level through locally embedded experts, access to the internet and 
cell phone networks that can all provide immediate mining-related information and 
feedback.  Additionally, the benefits that result from village level mining initiatives will 
increase motivation of Afghans to seek mining-related skills and educations at one of 
Afghanistan’s universities. Afghanistan’s government will be required to reach out to 
foreign investors and the International mining community to increase its mining 
knowledge and support, and trade its resources.  The government is considered corrupt 
from numerous perspectives, and its ability interact with foreign investors and mining 
companies provides it with an excellent opportunity for increased legitimacy.  A fortune 
in natural and mineral resources exists in the extremely diverse and challenging country 
of Afghanistan, and this strategy is designed to exploit them through mining in order to 
promote a common purpose for all of it people.  
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III. AREAS OF INTEREST: SECURITY CONDITIONS IN 
AFGHAN REGIONS WITH SIGNIFICANT RESOURCE 
ENDOWMENTS  
Because of its location at the meeting point of the Indian and Eurasian tectonic 
plates, Afghanistan has an abundance of natural resources.  This has been known for 
millennia.  Stones that form Egypt’s Great Pyramids have been shown to originate from 
Afghanistan and date back to around 2630 BC.113  There is evidence that Buddhists who 
settled in what are now Afghan lands nearly two millennia ago actively mined the 
country’s copper,114  and that Alexander the Great’s armies conducted mining operations 
in the country during the fourth century BC.115  Scholars have also found references to 
Afghanistan’s rubies in old Arabic writings from the tenth through fourteenth 
centuries,116 and in the accounts of famous travelers such as Marco Polo (1254–1324) 
and Ibn Battuta (1325–1354).117   
In more modern times, Britain and Russia were active in mapping and assessing 
Afghanistan’s natural and mineral resources during the 19th and 20th centuries.118  As 
previously mentioned, the United States took over this effort in the 21st century, leading 
to the landmark 2011 USGS report that identified over $1 trillion in a wide variety of 
natural and mineral resources available for exploitation in Afghanistan.  The 2011 USGS 
report delineated 24 “areas of interest” (AOIs) where most of Afghanistan’s natural and 
mineral resources are concentrated.  It is these AOIs that are the focus of this strategy.   
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In this chapter, I will evaluate the attractiveness of all 24 AOIs.  In addition to 
discussing their mineral endowments, I will also address logistics and security conditions 
in each AOI.  Clearly, AOIs with considerable physical potential for small-scale mining 
are more attractive near term candidates for implementation of the Resource Network 
Strategy.  The existence of good transportation links also renders an AOI more attractive.  
The long term objective of the Resource Network Strategy is of course to be able to 
secure areas that are currently infested with insurgents.  It is my belief, however, that the 
best places to focus on implementation in the initial phase of the program are in AOIs 
that are relatively secure.   
 
Figure 9.  An assessment of Afghanistan’s security situation by the United Nations. 
Department of Security Services in March, 2010.119   
In evaluating security conditions in each AOI, I will primarily exploit the United 
Nations Department of Security Services (UNDSS) assessment and map published in 
2010.120  The UNDSS assigned extreme, high, medium, and low-level security risk 
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assessments to all areas of Afghanistan (see Figure 9).  This will be supplemented by 
interviews with USSOF personnel familiar with the different AOIs, as well as data on 
VSO and ALP deployments in each area.121  
What follows is an overview of each AOI.122  Following that, an appendix will 
provide a description of the economic uses of each mineral discussed in the overview.  
1. Aynak 
The Aynak AOI is a 3,439 km2 area in southern Kabul, northern Logar and 
eastern Wardak Provinces. It contains world-class copper, cobalt, chromite, talc-
magnesite, and asbestos deposits.  Four sub-areas within the AOI contain prospective 
copper-gold deposits, and another sub-area has prospective chromite and platinum group 
element (PGE) deposits.123  In 2007, the Chinese government signed a 30-year deal with 
the Afghan Central Government to mine in the southern part of the Aynak AOI, but after 
being rocketed by locals, discovering Buddhist ruins, and promising (and not delivering) 
to hire Afghan locals for mining, their efforts have been temporarily curtailed.124  The 
northern parts of the Aynak AOI have been drilled by the TFBSO and may soon be bid 
out to local miners because of local Afghan knowledge of the area’s minerals. The 
western part of the Aynak AOI has more potential for chromite and asbestos.125 
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This AOI presents generally medium risks to security.  Security in Kabul 
Province, the country’s capital region, ranges from medium- to high-risk; and is high-risk 
in both Logar and Wardak Provinces.126  In 2012, approximately 667 ALP were assigned 
to the area, which have since increased.127  Numerous Coalition and Afghan security 
forces are assigned to this area to protect the country’s capital and its surrounding areas.  
2. Badakshan 
The Badakshan AOI is a 6,501 km2 area in the Badakshan Province, the country’s 
most northeastern region.  It contains numerous gold deposits and prospects.  The AOI’s 
Weka Dur placer gold deposit is one of Afghanistan’s largest gold-quartz veins. The 
AOI’s district subareas of Ragh (north), Baharak (southeast), and Fayzabad (south 
central) maintain numerous gold prospects.  A Turkish-Afghan company is the Afghan 
Central Government’s preferred bidder in this area, although they have not initiated 
mining.128  Locals also are conducting artisanal and placer mining in the area.129 
Additionally, there is iron skarn and lithium pegmatite potential in the AOI.130 
This AOI presents generally low risks to security.  In 2012, approximately 319 
ALP were assigned to the area, which have since increased.131  Few security forces have 
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3. Balkhab   
The Balkhab AOI is a 1,858 km2 area primarily in eastern Sar-i-Pul Province with 
small portions of it being in southern Balkh, and western Samangan Provinces.  It 
primarily contains deposits of copper and has coal and possibly granite-hosted gold 
deposits.  The Balkhab subarea is 321 km2 and has mostly copper.132  This area was 
tendered, or put up for bid, by the Afghan central government in December 2012.133 
This AOI presents medium risks to security.134  There is no current data available 
regarding ALP being assigned to this area.135  Security responsibilities in this area were 
transitioned from ISAF to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) on November 27, 
2011, and no information is available regarding their progress.136  Little news or 
reporting of insurgent activities has been received from this area. 
4. Daykundi 
The Daykundi AOI is a 6,838 km2 area in Daykundi and Bamyan Provinces.  It 
contains greisen tin and tungsten, a tin and tungsten skarn and vein, porphyry tin, lithium 
and tantalum pegmatite, and polymetallic vein prospects.137  Many of these areas are 
extremely remote and no roads are present.  Placer mining of tin and tungsten is a 
possibility in this area.138 
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This AOI presents generally medium security risks.  Security in Daykundi 
Province ranges from low-risk in its northern portions to extreme-risk in its southern 
portions, and Bamyan Province is of low-risk.139  In 2012, approximately 412 ALP were 
assigned to the area, which have since increased.140  The transitions of security 
responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF were initiated in Bamyan Province on March 22, 
2011; and November 27, 2011 for Daykundi Province’s northern portion and May 13, 
2012 for its southern portion.141  No current information is available regarding the 
ANSF’s progress in securing and stabilizing these areas. 
5. Dusar-Shaida-Misgaran 
The Dusar-Shaida-Misgaran AOI is a 9,000 km2 area in southwestern Herat and 
northern Farah Provinces.  It contains primarily copper and tin, and has three subareas.  
Subarea Dusar is known for its concentrations of copper, zinc and rare gold type 
minerals.  Subarea Shaida is known for its abundance of copper porphyry, zinc and iron 
ore deposits.  Subarea Misgaran is known for its abundance in skarn and veins in 
enriched tin and lead.142  This area was opened for investor bidding (or tendered) by the 
Afghan government in December 2012.143  Interestingly, the previous Provincial 
Governor of Herat Province is a geologist and completed his master’s thesis on the 
minerals in this area.144 
This AOI presents generally medium security risks.  Security in Herat Province 
ranges from low- to high-risk; and is high-risk in northern Farah.145  In 2012, 
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approximately 236 ALP were assigned to the area, which have since increased.146  The 
transitions of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF were initiated in Herat 
Province on November 27, 2011, and Farah Province on May 13, 2012.147  No recent 
information is available regarding the ANSF’s progress in securing and stabilizing these 
areas.  The rural terrain in this AOI is relatively sparse and only sporadically populated; 
therefore insurgents have a distinct disadvantage in this area.  
6. Haji-Gak 
The Haji-Gak AOI is a 2,340 km2 area located in Bamyan, Parwan and Wardak 
Provinces. The Haji-Gak iron deposit is 36 km2 and one of the largest iron ore deposits in 
all of Asia.  Several Afghan locals know of the potential for mining in this area.  The 
Afghan Central Government is negotiating deals with Indian investors in the Haji-Gak 
area, although no mining has been initiated.148  Additionally, just 75 km east of this AOI, 
at the head of the Balkh River, copper oxide exists and mining potential is high.149  
This AOI presents generally high security risks.  Security in Bamyan Province is 
of low-risk, Parwan of medium-risk, and Wardak of high-risk.150  In 2012, approximately 
76 ALP were assigned to the area, which have since increased.151 The transition of 
security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF was initiated on March 22, 2011 in Bamyan 
Province and December 31, 2012 in northern Wardak Province.152  No current 
information is available regarding the ANSF’s progress in securing and stabilizing these 
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areas.  The terrain in this AOI is very mountainous, therefore difficult to traverse, and 
provides insurgents with a distinct advantage.  
7. Katawas 
The Katawas gold AOI is a 478 km2 area in Paktika Province’s Katawas Basin.  
Mercury, tungsten, gold and (or) lead are present within this basin. This AOI is thought to 
have potential for the occurrences of small- to medium-sized placer gold, silver, mercury, 
and base metal deposits with near-term mineral production potential.153 
This AOI presents generally high security risks.154  In 2012, approximately 428 
ALP were assigned to the area, which have since increased.155  The transitions of security 
responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF in this AOI were initiated on May 13, 2012 in 
Paktika Province and December 31, 2012 in Ghazni Province.156  No current information 
is available regarding the ANSF’s progress in securing and stabilizing the area, which is a 
location where Afghan insurgents have been known to operate.  
8. Kharnak-Kanjar 
The Kharnak-Kanjar mercury AOI is a 380 km northeasterly running belt of 
mercury prospects primarily in Ghor Province. This AOI is located mostly in Pasaband 
District, in Ghor Province with small portions of it in Du Lina, Khadir and Taywarah 
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Districts.157  There is potential here for artisanal production of mercury by retort 
technology.  Gold may also be present within this belt.158   
This AOI presents generally medium risks to security.159  In 2012, approximately 
273 ALP were assigned to the area, which have since increased.160  The transition of 
security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF in the majority of this AOI was initiated on 
December 31, 2012.161  Insurgent activities in this AOI have been relatively insignificant, 
although no current information is available regarding the ANSF’s progress in securing 
and stabilizing the area. 
9. Kundalan   
The Kundalan copper and gold AOI is a 2,576 km2 area spanning both Zabul and 
Kandahar Provinces.  Its internal subareas are the Charsu-Ghambad, Baghawan-Garangh 
and Kunang skarns.  Mineral deposits in this AOI are porphyry copper-gold, copper-
(gold) skarn, gold-rich polymetallic veins and gold-rich skarn deposits.  The majority of 
the mineral data on this AOI came from the USSR and its Eastern European allies 
between the 1950s and 1985.  They did extensive sampling and trenching in the area and 
developed copper and gold resources in the main Kundalan ore body. A number of 
additional prospects are present within this AOI that have not yet received extensive 
exploration.162   
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This AOI presents generally high risks to security.163  In 2012, approximately 288 
ALP were assigned to the area, which have since increased.164  This AOI’s initiation of 
the transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF occurred on June 18, 
2013.165  This is an area where insurgents have operated very freely for over a decade.  
No information is available regarding the area’s recently introduced ANSF and their 
progress in securing and stabilizing the area.  
10. Nalbandon 
The Nalbandon lead and zinc AOI is a 6,250 km2 area in both Ghor and eastern 
Herat Provinces.  Specifically, this AOI is in the eastern half of Shahrak District, 
southwestern quarters of Tulak and Chisti Sharif Districts in Ghor Province.  This AOI 
contains numerous sediment-hosted Mississippi Valley-type lead-zinc prospects.  
Germans and Russians examined the minerals in this AOI very extensively between 1963 
and 1978.166   
This AOI presents generally medium risks to security.167  In 2012, approximately 
129 ALP were assigned to the area, which have since increased.168  The initiation of the 
transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF in the majority of this AOI 
occurred on December, 31, 2012.169  No current information is available regarding the 
area’s recently introduced ANSF and their progress in securing and stabilizing the area. 
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11. North Takhar  
The North Takhar Placer Gold AOI is a 6,000 km2 area in Takhar and eastern 
Badakshan Provinces, and borders Tajikistan to the north.  It is Afghanistan’s largest 
placer gold deposit and contains several commercial grade gold reserves.  The area’s 
largest deposit, Samti, has estimated reserves of more than 30,000 kg of gold.170  This 
area was mined by the ancient Greeks and has seen substantial artisanal and placer 
mining activity since then.171     
This AOI presents generally low risks to security.172  In 2012, approximately 
1,157 ALP were assigned to the area, which have since increased.173  The initiation of the 
transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF in the majority of this AOI 
occurred on November 27, 2011.174  The ANSF have had almost two years to stabilize 
this area, although no current information is available regarding their progress in the area. 
12. Panjshir Valley  
The Panjshir Valley AOI is a 959 km2 area in northwestern Parwan Province’s 
Hisa-e-Awal Panjshir District.  Silver-iron, pegmatite, and emerald deposits lie within its 
central area and some subareas. This area has been mined for thousands of years, and 
while it has steep terrain and is difficult to access, the Panjshir Valley is a popular and 
peaceful place to travel.175 
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This AOI presents low risks to security.176  There is no current data available 
regarding ALP being assigned to this area.177  This AOI’s initiation of the transition of 
security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF occurred on March 22, 2011.178  The ANSF 
have had almost two years to stabilize this historically high-valued area, although no 
current information is available regarding their progress in securing and stabilizing the 
area.  
13. Tourmaline 
The Tourmaline tin AOI is a 1,365 km2 area in Farah Province’s western Anar 
Darah District and portions of Shin Dand District of Herat Province.  This AOI contains  
tin and tungsten veins, porphyry or greisen, and stockwork deposits.179  The main 
tourmaline tin prospect was trenched and sampled by the Soviets.  There are also tin 
placer deposits in the area.180   
This AOI presents medium risks to security.181  In 2012, approximately 115 ALP 
were assigned to the area, which have since increased.182  The transitions of security 
responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF in this AOI were first initiated on March 13, 2012, 
and more recently on December 31, 2012.183  The ANSF have experienced success in 
their attempts to secure in this area, which is largely due to the support of Afghan locals 
and leaders.   
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14. Zarkashan 
The Zarkashan gold and copper AOI is a 1,692 km2 area in Ghazni Province’s 
Ab-Band, Afghandab, Gelan, Glarabaghn, Jaghuri and Mokur Districts. This AOI has 
three subareas, which include the Luman-Tamaki gold, Bolo gold, and Zarkashan mine 
subareas.  These areas are considered of high potential for placer and artisanal mining, 
and commercial mineralized rock.  The area was tendered in December, 2012.184  Very 
little gold cold and copper collection has occurred in these areas.     
This AOI presents generally high risks to security.185  In 2012, approximately 514 
ALP were assigned to the area, which have since increased.186  Security responsibilities 
in this AOI were first transitioned from ISAF to ANSF on May 13, 2012 in its northern 
portion, and later on December 31, 2012 in its southern portion.187  No information is 
available regarding the ANSF’s newly established efforts and effectiveness in this 
volatile and insurgent-saturated area.  
15. Baghlan 
The Baghlan clay and gypsum AOI is a 1,800 km2 area in three different 
provinces: Talawa Barfak District, Baghlan Province; Kahmard District, Bamyan 
Province; and Ruyi Du A, Samangan Province.  Clay, gypsum, and bauxite are the 
minerals in this AOI.  This area lies within a rectangular region of mountains and valleys 
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running southwest and northeast with the Hindu Kush range. This region offers high 
potential for further exploration, although is relatively inaccessible.188 
This AOI presents generally medium risks to security.189  There is no current data 
available regarding ALP being employed in this area.190  Security responsibilities in this 
AOI were transitioned from ISAF to ANSFon March 22, 2011 in its southern portion, and 
later on November 27, 2011 in its northern portion.191  The ANSF have had almost two 
years to stabilize this area, although no current information is available regarding their 
progress in securing and stabilizing the area. 
16. Bakhud 
The Bakhud fluorite AOI is a 3,637 km2 area in southern Uruzgan and northern 
Kandahar Provinces.  A variety of minerals exist in this AOI, including chalcopyrite, 
barite, galena, sphalerite, tennantite, and fluorite. Fluorite is considered the most 
economically promising commodity in this AOI.192  This AOI was recently bid out and 
members of the Afghan Geological Survey have planned for visits to the area for further 
assessments.193 
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This AOI presents generally high risks to security.194  In 2012, approximately 788 
ALP were assigned to the area, which have since increased.195  This AOI’s first initiation 
of the transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF occurred on June May 
13, 2012 in its northern portion, and second on June 18, 2013.196  This is an area where 
insurgents have operated freely and used as a safe haven for over a decade.  No recent 
information is available regarding the area’s recently introduced ANSF and their progress 
in securing and stabilizing the area.  
17. Dudkash 
The Dudkash industrial minerals AOI is a 4,922 km2 area of mountainous, semi-
mountainous and basin terrain, overlapping north and central Baghlan Provinces, and 
southeastern Kunduz and Takhar Provinces.  The industrial minerals in this AOI include 
cement-grade limestone, dolomite, celestite, gypsum, brick clay, bauxite-laterite, and 
coal.  Coal is currently mined in Nahrin District, Baghlan Province.197 
This AOI presents low risks to security.198  In 2012, approximately 729 ALP 
were assigned to the area, which have since increased.199 This AOI’s first initiation of the 
transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF occurred on June May 13, 
2012, and second on December 31, 2012.200  No recent information is available regarding 
the area’s recently introduced ANSF and their progress in securing and stabilizing the 
area.  
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18. Ghunday-Achin   
The Ghunday-Achin magnesite and talc AOI is 6,095 km2 and exists along the 
Pakistan border about 16 km south of Jalalabad in Nangahar and Paktya Provinces.  At 
Achin, the two major talc deposits are estimated to be 1.25 million and 31.2 million 
metric tons, both with high (76 percent and 81 percent) contents of pure talc.  More than 
50,000 metric tons of talc have been mined in Ghunday, although it is unknown as to 
when.  At Achin, large magnesite bodies exist, and are suspected to be at a similar scale 
to the talc endowment in the area.201   
This AOI presents high risks to security.202  In 2012, approximately 1,185 ALP 
were assigned to the area, which have since increased.203 This AOI’s first initiation of the 
transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF occurred on June May 13, 
2012, and second on June 18, 2013.204  No recent information is available regarding the 
area’s recently introduced ANSF and their progress in securing and stabilizing the area.  
This area has been commonly known to be saturated with insurgents, many of whom 
conduct nefarious cross-border activities with Pakistan.  
19. Khanneshin 
The Khanneshin carbonatite AOI is 6,750 km2 in the Registan Desert of south-
central Helmand Province.  The rare earth elements (REE) Carbonatite, uranium and 
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earth’s REE, therefore this area is strategically important due the amount of REE in the 
area and the world’s demand for it.205  The carbonatite complex may also have potential 
for uranium, cement limestone and phosphate.206 
This AOI presents high risks to security.207  In 2012, approximately 87 ALP were 
assigned to the area, which have since increased.208 This AOI’s initiation of the transition 
of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF occurred on June May 13, 2012.209  No 
recent information is available regarding the area’s recently introduced ANSF and their 
progress in securing and stabilizing the area.  This area has been known to experience 
insurgent activities, most of which are based-out of the province’s northern region and 
Kandahar Province.  
20. Kunduz 
The Kunduz AOI is a 2,266 km2 area in the southern part of Kunduz and northern 
part of Baghlan Province.  Minerals in the area include a celestite deposit in Kartau and 
Kartaw Districts, and geology and infrastructure in the area indicate potential for sand 
and gravel, gypsum, limestone, sulfur and rocks suitable for dimension stone deposits.210 
This AOI presents medium risks to security.211  In 2012, approximately 453 ALP 
were assigned to the area, which have since increased.212 This AOI’s initiation of the 
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transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF occurred on June May 13, 
2012.213  No recent information is available regarding the area’s recently introduced 
ANSF and their progress in securing and stabilizing the area.  This area has been known 
to experience insurgent activities, although Coalition forces have maintained important 
relationships with key leaders in the area.  These relationships suggests an Afghan desire 
for stability and security.  
21. North Herat   
The North Herat AOI is a 12,314 km2 polygon shaped area in northwestern Herat 
Province.  Limestone exists in its primary 9,684 km2 area in the northwest and limestone-
clay in its 2,630 km2 southern portion. Additionally, a barite vein and iron skarn, marble, 
and brick clay exist in the AOI.214 
This AOI presents medium risks to security.215 In 2012, approximately 242 ALP 
were assigned to the area, and this number has since increased.216 This AOI’s initiation 
of the transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF occurred on November 
27, 2011.217  No recent information is available regarding the ANSF and their progress in 
securing and stabilizing the area.  Insurgent activities in this AOI have been mostly 
sporadic, which may partially be due to the key relationships between Coalition Forces 
and influential Afghans in the area.   
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22. Nuristan 
The Nuristan rare-metal pegmatite AOI is primarily located in the east-central 
part of Nuristan Province and is located in the Hindu Kush Mountains.  This AOI 
contains four main pegmatite fields: Pacigram, Paron, Kantiway and Darrahe Pec.  The 
demand for rare metals is high due to their individual properties that are important for 
high tech industrial uses.  Pegmatites in this area of Afghanistan are considered by many 
as the largest concentration of lithium-bearing pegmatites in the world.218 
This AOI presents high risks to security.219  In 2012, approximately 358 ALP 
were assigned to the area, and this number has since increased.220 This AOI’s initiation 
of the transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF occurred just recently on 
June 18, 2013.221  No recent information is available regarding the ANSF and their 
progress in securing and stabilizing the area.  Insurgent activities in this AOI have been 
intense and consistent, which is likely due to its highly challenging terrain and close 
proximity to the Pakistani border.   
23. Southern Helmand 
The Southern Helmand AOI is a 10,000 km2 in southern Helmand Province along 
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deposits that are being exploited and the area has significant potential for porphyry 
copper deposits.222  Porphry copper and porphyry copper-gold deposits are present along 
the same geologic belts to the south in Pakistan.223 
This AOI presents generally high risks to security.224  In 2012, approximately 87 
ALP were assigned to the area, which have since increased.225 This AOI’s first initiation 
of the transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF occurred on May 13, 
2012, and second more recently on June 18, 2013.226  No recent information is available 
regarding the ANSF and their progress in securing and stabilizing the area.  Coalition 
forces have remained heavily involved in this area for a decade and insurgent activities 
have remained intense and consistent.  This is likely due to its close proximity to the 
Pakistani border and being a Pashtun controlled area, an Afghan ethnicity common to that 
of the insurgents.  
24. Takhar 
The Takhar AOI is located in central Takhar Province. It contains evaporite-
related minerals such as salt, gypsum, and celestite deposits.  Additionally, clay, coal and 
dimension stone exist, and there are strong prospects for mercury, sand, gravel, 
limestone, sulfur, and other commodities in the area.  This AOI contains potential 
resources that may support a placer and artisanal mining industry, but there is potential 
for larger industries and markets related to minerals in this AOI.227   
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This AOI presents low risks to security.228  In 2012, approximately 119 ALP 
were assigned to the area, and this number has since increased.229 This AOI’s initiation 
of the transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF occurred on November 
27, 2011.230  The ANSF have had about two years to gain influence in this area, although 
no information is available regarding the ANSF’s influence in the region.  Coalition 
forces have remained heavily involved in this area for a decade, and it has not been an 
area commonly known for consistent and over-aggressive insurgent activities.    
A. CONCLUSION 
The USGS has provided a more detailed illustration of these AOIs on the map 
shown in Figure 12. This map is the result of the application of advanced mineral 
assessment techniques and incorporates the more qualitative assessments made by the 
Russians and British in the past.   Known mineral occurrences (small dots) and promising 
areas (grey boxes) identified by the USGS and Joint Mineral Resources Assessment 
Team are likely locations for opportunities to exploit mineral deposits in commercial 
quantities, with the primary export commodities being copper, iron, lead, zinc, mercury, 
rare-earth elements, uranium, chromite, and gold.  Potential commercial deposits of 
industrial minerals for local use are also identified, and include asbestos, barite, celestite, 
clay, pegmatite minerals and elements, potash, sulfur, talc, magnesite, stone, glass sands, 
limestone, sand, and gravel.231 
 
 
                                                 
228 BBC News, “Afghan Troop Map: US and NATO Deployments.” 
229 Saum-Manning, “VSO/ALP: Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local Defense,” 
Small Wars Journal; Saum-Manning, “VSO/ALP,” 9. 
230 NATO, Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead.”  
231 Stephen G. Peters et al., eds., Preliminary Non-Fuel Mineral Resource Assessment, vol. I– II, 




Figure 10.  This map of Afghanistan illustrates the country’s known mineral occurrences 
(small dots) and 20 areas of priority identified by the USGS and Afghan 
Geological Survey Joint Mineral Assessment Team and have “promise for 
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IV. THE LOGIC OF THE RESOURCE NETWORK STRATEGY 
At the core of this Resource Network Strategy lie three inter-related ideas.  The 
first is that by offering local Afghan communities assistance in the small-scale 
development of natural resources, the VSO program could become more attractive to 
“rational” rural Afghan communities.  The second is that development of small-scale-
mining is a necessary step towards the future establishment of large-scale industrial 
mining in Afghanistan.  The third is that the successful introduction of large-scale mining 
will promote social and economic change in Afghanistan that might one day secure the 
country and put an end to the Taliban insurgency.   
The center of gravity233 of each of these inter-related ideas is the Afghan people.  
Most Afghans are “… self-interested rational actors, and develop an investment logic to 
explain economic and political decisions.”234  Therefore, while explaining these three 
inter-related ideas as they relate to the Resource Network Strategy, it will be assumed 
that, in general, Afghans will continue to make decisions that achieve the highest net 
benefits.  Let us consider each of these ideas in turn.   
A. VSO SITES AND ARTISANAL MINING        
As discussed in Chapter III, Afghanistan is well endowed with a plethora of 
natural and mineral resources, and has the potential to become a world class “mining 
district.”  Yet today, there is little organized industrial-scale mining taking place in 
Afghanistan.  Rather, there is considerable informal or illegal artisanal mining taking 
place, as impoverished rural Afghans literally scratch at the surface of the great wealth 
that lies below them in order to survive.   
                                                 
233 The center of gravity is explained by Clausewitz as the “hub of all power and movement, and 
which everything depends… the point at which all our energies should be directed.’” in the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2011), III-22. 
234 Forrest D. Colburn, “Current Studies of Peasants and Rural Development: Applications of the 
World Political Economy Approach,” World Politics 34, no. 3 (1982): abstract (summary). 
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Currently, the Afghan government does everything in its power to discourage 
artisanal mining,235 which it sees as an impediment to formal development of industrial 
scale mining.  This opposition, however, does little to actually stop informal or illegal 
mining.  Since government security forces do not physically control most of Afghanistan, 
there is simply no way to enforce legal restrictions on informal natural resource 
exploitation.236  
What official government hostility to small-scale mining does is deny miners: (i) 
access to credit and financial services; (ii) transport infrastructure; (iii) access to best 
environmental and safety practices; and (iv) legal redress for any business disputes that 
may arise.  The consequences are dire.  Afghan artisanal mining is unsafe and 
environmentally dangerous.  Productivity is low and costs are high.  Worst of all, output 
must be sold on black markets at a significant discount to open market prices and, given 
that insurgents often run these black markets, a considerable portion of the resultant 
profits flow to the enemy.   For example, TFBSO and USGS personnel have stated that to 
the best of their knowledge, Afghans miners paid only about 25 percent of what they 
should be receiving for minerals such as chromite that they are apparently selling to the 
Haqqani network across the international border in Pakistan.237   
This reality could be changed significantly if the VSO program targeted regions 
where extensive artisanal mining is already taking place or where there is considerable 
potential for development of small-scale mining.  In such areas, the VSO program could 
offer local communities assistance in the development of their natural resources.  VSO 
                                                 
235“Afghan Minister Cracks Down on Illegal Mining,” Radio Free Europe, July 2, 2010, accessed 
October 27, 2013, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Afghan_Minister_Cracks_Down_On_Illegal_Mining/2089388.html; Amanda 
Lanzillo, “Lack of Regulation Limits Afghan Gem Mining,” Global Risk Insights, accessed October 27, 
2013, http://globalriskinsights.com/2013/06/03/lack-of-regulation-limits-afghan-gem-mining/; Karim 
Amini, “Illegal Mining in Afghanistan at an All-Time High,” Tolo News, July 16, 2013, accessed October 
27, 2013, http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/11241-illegal-mining-in-afghanistan-scales-a-new-
high-1400-mines-extracted-illegally.  
236 Emails and conversations with an Anonymous source who is the 2013 TFBSO Director of 
Development; Michael Chornack a current USGS hydrologist and 2010–2012 member of the TFBSO; Bob 
Miller a miner, geologist and senior advisor for the TFBSO 2010–2012; Steve Peters a current USGS 
geologist and 2010–2012 member of the TFBSO; and Emily Scott-King the minerals project lead for the 
TFBSO from 2010–2012. 
237 Ibid. 
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sites would offer training in best practices, access to the credit required to purchase good 
equipment, protection from bandits, and perhaps most important, the ability to monetize 
production at competitive prices.   
In aggregate, this would greatly enhance the benefits that rural Afghan 
communities would enjoy if they hosted a VSO site and established an ALP force.  If, as 
some evidence indicates,238 Afghan peasants make rational decisions regarding their 
welfare when choosing whether to collaborate with Coalition forces or support the 
Taliban, the result would be a mass shift of support from the insurgency towards the 
government and the Coalition.  Afghan villages in areas with large resource endowments 
would enjoy such significant benefits from hosting a VSO element that they would be 
competing for the privilege, and the insurgents would be “priced out” of competing for 
support through large portions of the country. 
The trial effort to promote artisanal mining in Kunar Province (explained in 
Chapter I) illustrates the great potential that such an initiative would have in garnering 
local support.  Between November 2011 and April 2012, USSOF based at FOB Penich in 
Kas Kunar District (Kunar Province) hosted a TFBSO pilot program that offered artisanal 
chromite miners the opportunity to sell their ore to foreign investors.  The results were 
stunning—over 60 informal local miners scattered throughout Kunar participated in the 
program and a total 45 metric tons (99,000 lbs.) of chromite ore were consolidated at 
FOB Penich by Afghan miners.239  Word of the effort spread, and miners from other 
regions began to approach the TFBSO and ask if they could establish similar programs in 
their areas as well.  In return, explicit offers where made by several Afghans to drive out 
insurgents and safeguard the safety of Coalition personnel involved in the initiative.  
Unfortunately, the USSOF and TFBSO initiative at FOB Penich was discontinued after 
the Afghan Ministry of Mines determined that the mining activity in Kunar was illegal 
pending completion of a comprehensive mining law. 
                                                 
238 Colburn, “Peasants and Rural Development,” World Politics 34.  
239 Anonymous TFBSO member, July, 2013; Peters, July, 2013; Miller, August, 2013; TFBSO 
Memorandum, “TFBSO Phase II Village Stability Operations Program Assessment” (TFBSO 
memorandum at Pentagon, Washington DC, April 17, 2012), 3, received from Emily Scott-King in email to 
author, August 17, 2013. 
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B. “MINING BRINGS MINING” 
In interviews and discussions with USGS geologists and senior managers240 of 
mining firms, I was told repeatedly that—contrary to the position of the Afghan Ministry 
of Mines—promotion and development of a thriving small scale mining industry in 
Afghanistan would actually facilitate the establishment of the large scale industrial mines 
required to fulfill the economic potential embodied in Afghanistan’s mineral resources.  
Some interviewees referred to the need to develop a “mining culture” in Afghanistan, 
while others simply stated that “mining brings mining.”241  
In economic terms, what they were saying was that mining is an industry that 
enjoys “increasing economies of scope”—that it is efficient to engage in mining in an 
area where a lot of other people are engaged in mining.  Examples of industries with such 
increasing economies of scope include Hollywood (film and entertainment) and Silicon 
Valley (information technology).  Mining exhibits increasing returns to scope for similar 
reasons.  Mines require an entire ecosystem of suppliers.  They also require a lot of 
specialized manpower, and it is common for miners to move from mine to mine 
depending on where their skills are required.  In addition, interviewees repeatedly 
emphasized that industrial scale exploration efforts always began with a careful analysis 
of what artisanal miners had already found and where they were operating.  Indeed, I was 
told that prospectors even look for evidence of ancient mining activity! 
C. LARGE-SCALE MINING 
When the USGS issued its final 2011 report on Afghanistan, there was 
considerable excitement in Kabul, where government officials assumed that 
representatives of global mining majors like BHP and Rio Tinto would soon be at their 
                                                 
240 Interviews were conducted with between the author and Corrodo De Gasperis, Director, President 
& Chief Executive Officer, Comstock Mining, Virginia City, NV; and Robert Stepper, General Manager, 
Coeur Rochester, Lovelock, NV on July 11–12, 2013.  
241 This information was gained through emails and conversations with an anonymous source who is 
the 2013 TFBSO Director of Development; Michael Chornack a current USGS hydrologist and 2010–2012 
member of the TFBSO; Corrodo De Gasperis, Director, President & Chief Executive Officer, Comstock 
Mining, Virginia City, NV; Bob Miller a miner, geologist and senior advisor for the TFBSO 2010–2012; 
Steve Peters a current USGS geologist and 2010–2012 member of the TFBSO; Emily Scott-King the 
minerals project lead for the TFBSO from 2010–2012; and Robert Stepper, General Manager, Coeur 
Rochester, Lovelock, NV from June-August, 2013.  
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doorsteps.  There was also considerable excitement within the Coalition, with General 
Petraeus stating that Afghanistan’s mineral endowment has “stunning potential” and is 
“potentially hugely significant,” in the conflict with the Taliban.242  Even Mullah Omar, 
the Taliban’s highly influential leader, has stated to the Afghan public that—should they 
win—they would make an active effort to develop the great wealth embodied in the 
country’s natural resources.243  But nothing has happened.  
According to interviewees, there are three reasons why marquee-mining firms 
have yet to show serious interest in Afghanistan.  One reason is the security conditions 
that prevail on the ground.244  For example, representatives of the Chinese firm 
apparently trying to develop the Aynak copper deposit in 2012 found themselves on the 
receiving end of a barrage of rocket attacks in Logar Province.  The industry majors do 
not like to operate in areas where the locals are attacking them. 
The second reason is the utter confusion that surrounds the legal status of natural 
resource initiatives in Afghanistan.  A coherent Mining Law still eludes the Afghan 
government, and in its absence, only the most speculative (and often least competent) 
mining firms are willing to gamble that their investments in Afghanistan will eventually 
pay off.245 
 
                                                 
242 “Report: $1 Trillion in Untapped Minerals Found in Afghanistan,” CNN, June 14, 2010, accessed 
October 27, 2013, http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/14/report-1-trillion-in-untapped-minerals-found-in-
afghanistan/.  
243 Amie Ferris-Rotman, “RPT-Afghan Taliban Say Want to Develop Mining Sector,” Reuters, 
August 29, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/afghanistan-taliban-mining-
idAFL4E7JT1IZ20110829.  
244 Tarek Ghani, September 17, 2013, comment on thesis to Dr. Jonathan Lipow (an advisor for this 
thesis), at UC Berkeley, CA. Tarek Ghani is a Ph.D. candidate in Business and Public Policy at UC 
Berkeley’s Haas School of Business, a native Afghan, and the son of Ashraf Ghani. Ashraf Ghani was the 
former chancellor of Kabul University, worked for the World Bank on international development and 
assistance, and was Afghanistan’s Minister of Finance from 2002–2004. Ashraf Ghani is the current 
Chairman for the Institute of State Effectiveness, which was established in Afghanistan in 2005 to 
improves states’ ability to serve the citizens. Anonymous TFBSO member, July, 2013; Peters, July, 2013; 
Miller, August, 2013; Scott-King, personal communications with author, August, 2013.  
245 Ibid.  
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Finally, the cost of exploration and production in Afghanistan is high, to a great 
extent due to the absence of a well-developed and thriving artisanal mining industry 
that—as mentioned above—appears to be a necessary prerequisite for successful 
industrial scale mining.246 
Clearly, it is beyond the capacity of USSOCOM, or even the Coalition as a whole, 
to assure that a sensible mining law is implemented.  Only the Afghan government can do 
that.  But implementation of the Resource Network Strategy—outlined in detail in the 
next chapter—should establish both a secure environment in areas with important natural 
resource endowments, as well as a thriving artisanal mining industry.  In other words, the 
Resource Network Strategy could overcome most of the obstacles that impede the 
development of an industrial scale mining industry in Afghanistan.   
This chapter’s three inter-related ideas lie at the core of the Resource Network 
Strategy.  USSOF’s assistance with small-scale development of natural and mineral 
resources could offer “rational” Afghans attractive benefits that exceed many others 
currently available to them.   This strategy aims to develop small-scale mining, which is a 
necessary step in the eventual establishment of large-scale industrial mining in 
Afghanistan.  The goal of realizing large-scale mining in Afghanistan could provide an 
impetus with significant potential for promoting social and economic change that could 
better secure the country, and greatly diminish insurgent violence.  Chapter V, The 
Resource Network Strategy, provides further explanation and details of how USSOF will 
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V. THE RESOURCE NETWORK STRATEGY 
“…planning is everything.” 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, November 14, 1957247 
The Resource Network Strategy is in essence, a military plan.  Its execution 
incorporates SOF from all military services, but also engages numerous civilian entities 
from both the U.S. and allied nations.  In writing this chapter, the guidelines of Joint 
Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, were utilized.  JP 5-0 “reflects the current 
doctrine for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities across the 
full range of military operations.”248  The purpose of using JP 5-0 as a guide for 
developing this strategy is to promote and communicate a common understanding of it to 
as many U.S. and allied military and civilian organizations as possible.   
This exposition of the Resource Network Strategy (RNS) starts with its goals and 
objectives, then summarizes the external environment and operational constraints and 
examines and offers numerous detailed recommendations for its execution.  The RNS is 
not a detailed plan per se.  Instead it is a guide to planning aimed at gaining the initiative 
and achieving victory in Afghanistan by using numerous SOF and civilian networks that 
already exist in the country.  
A. STRATEGIC GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The Resource Network Strategy is designed to further the war aims of America 
and its allies.  As such, it cannot be evaluated without reference to the overall Allied 
strategic goals and objectives in Afghanistan.  For the purposes of this thesis, it is  
assumed that the overall Allied goal is to achieve a victory for NATO and Afghan  
government forces in the conflict that began in November 2001 with the fall of the 
Taliban regime.  Victory is defined as being achieved when the following strategic goals 
are met: 
                                                 
247 “Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum, and Boyhood Home: Quotes,” accessed 
October 8, 2013, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/quotes.html.  
248 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2011), Chairman’s Letter. 
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1. Afghanistan poses no terrorist or insurgent threat to any other country.  
2. Afghanistan is not faced with any meaningful internal security threat. 
3. Afghanistan safeguards group rights for all of its communities. 
4. Afghanistan safeguards the individual rights for all of its citizens in a 
manner consistent with the spirit of the United Nation’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  
5. The economic and social dynamic in Afghanistan assures the long-term 
sustainability of the achievements outlined above. 
6. Non-SOF foreign military intervention is not required to maintain the 
status quo. 
The purpose of the Resource Network Strategy is to offer decision makers a 
credible strategic concept that realistically offers NATO and the Afghan Government a 
roadmap for advancing towards all six goals outlined above.  This strategy’s objectives 
are aimed to: 
1. Deny insurgents access to revenue currently being earned from illegal 
mining. 
2. Create significant and sustainable economic incentives for local regions 
that cooperate with Coalition forces and assist in defeating insurgents in 
their area. 
3. Physically secure high value mining areas.   
4. Promote the small-scale artisanal mining industry. 
5. Increase awareness and understanding in the international mining industry 
regarding opportunities in Afghanistan.  
6. Promote economic interdependence and integration between different 
Afghan communities, and between communities and the central 
government of Afghanistan. 
How do these objectives advance the Coalition’s overall goals?  
1. (Objective 1) The reduction of financial resources available to the Taliban 
and Haqqani Network would reduce each group’s threat capabilities and 
the overall effectiveness of their insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
2  (Objective 2) Establishing conditions and incentives for local populations 
to commit themselves to COIN efforts enabled by the VSO/ALP program 
would also further the goals of domestic stability and reduce the security 
threat to Pakistan that emanates from Afghanistan.   
3. (Objective 3) Secure mining conditions in Afghanistan will contribute to 
the establishment of long-term economic and social dynamics of 
development and industrialization.  Coalition control of mining areas, in 
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partnership with local communities, will help safeguard communal and 
individual rights that are often taken advantage of during mining booms.  
4. (Objecive 4) Assistance for the Afghan mining industry in reaching the 
critical mass required for large-scale initiatives to become viable will 
contribute to a positive economic dynamic and also aid in safeguarding 
communal and individual rights.  
5. (Objective 5) An increased understanding of the opportunities in 
Afghanistan by the international mining industry will make it easier for 
the major resource extraction firms to analyze and evaluate the viability of 
large-scale initiatives that will significantly advance the goals of long-term 
economic and social sustainability.  
6. (Objective 6) Enabling Afghan communities to become more 
economically interdependent will strengthen the country’s national 
identity, nationhood, and the Afghan Government’s political legitimacy.  
B. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND OPERATIONAL  CONSTRAINTS 
In developing the Resource Network Strategy, the following stylized facts are 
assumed regarding the external environment that has to be appreciated and/or overcome: 
1. NATO combat forces will withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014 as 
planned. 
2. USSOCOM efforts in Afghanistan will be allowed to continue indefinitely 
beyond that date. 
3. This USSOCOM effort will include sufficient USSOF and associated 
assets to maintain and support 100 village stability operations (VSO) sites. 
4. There will be little political support in the U.S. and other NATO countries 
for continued involvement in Afghanistan, little appetite for additional 
expenditures in support of the mission there, and little tolerance for 
activities that result in additional allied casualties. 
5. The Afghan central government will view policies, programs and 
initiatives that bypass or do not involve it with skepticism and suspicion.  
6. Current efforts to develop flagship mining projects will continue to 
flounder due to poor security conditions, inexperience at the Ministry of 
Mines (MoM), and the absence of the economies of scope249 offered by 
development of a “mining culture.” 
                                                 
249 John C. Pazar and Robert D. Willig define and explain “economies of scope” as a “… a basic and 
intuitively appealing property of production: cost savings, which result from the scope (rather than the 
scale) of the enterprise” and “There are economies of scope where it is less costly to combine two or more 
product lines in one firm than to produce them separately.” John C. Pazar and Robert D. Willig, 
“Economies of Scope,” The American Economic Review 71, 2 (1981): 268.  
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C. STRATEGIC CONCEPT    
This Resource Network Strategy will be pursued in three overlapping phases and 
are illustrated in Figure 11 (p. 86).  This strategy incorporates many of the USSOF and 
U.S. civilian entities and their networks currently operating in Afghanistan at both the 
village and national levels.  Three core and highly influential concepts and principles are 
intertwined throughout this strategy in order to achieve success in Afghanistan: the use of 
networks to gain influence with the Afghans, and with international mining companies 
and investors; basic economic principles to ensure the benefits of this strategy exceed the 
cost (as explained in Chapter IV); and information dominance250 to ensure the 
appropriate information reaches the minds of the right people.  Furthermore, these 
concepts and principles apply at the strategic, or political, operational and tactical levels.  
These concepts do not stand alone and mutually support one another.   
Phase I will be initiated by USSOF shifting its highly influential VSO networks 
towards Afghanistan’s natural and mineral resources deposit areas, and the people 
residing near them. These deposits must be large enough to increase Afghan community 
standards of living and socioeconomic development.  The decisive effort,251 USSOF 
VSO elements, will embed with local Afghan villages to promote, enable and support 
mining, and set conditions for larger mining initiatives. Further, and highly important, is 
an information campaign that will be established and conducted to promote and explain 
this strategy to Afghans and relevant international mining, investment and financial 
entities.  This information campaign will be directed towards local, national, regional and 
international communities, and be conducted by USSOF, the DoS, USAID, and the 
Afghans.  The decisive point252 is when USSOF VSO elements have embedded in areas 
                                                 
250 John Arquilla, “The Strategic Implications of Information Dominance,” Strategic Review 22.3 
(July, 1994), 24.  
251 This thesis uses the term “decisive effort” interchangeably with “decisive operation.” A decisive 
operation is defined as “The operation that directly accomplishes the mission.” Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 16, 2012), Glossary 2.  
252 Decisive points are defined as “A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function 
that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute 
materially to achieving success.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 
GL-8.  
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surrounding or within half of the 24 AOIs explained in Chapter III.  Numerous elements, 
not by quantity, but by effectiveness, will support253 USSOF VSO elements and the 
villagers themselves.   
Individuals from U.S. and Afghan civilian organizations, such as USGS, USAID, 
DoS, the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum and Geological Survey and 
contractors with knowledge of mining, will directly support the USSOF VSO elements 
and Afghan villages. This support will be conducted by directly embedding in Afghan 
villages with USSOF or from secure bases with direct lines of communication to USSOF 
embedded in the villages. The purpose of support by civilian entities is to fill USSOF’s 
and Afghan villagers’ knowledge gaps related to mining and positively influence 
increased mining efforts.  Enablers currently embedded with USSOF VSO elements will 
remain in support of them.   
At national levels, USSOF, the TFBSO and DoS, USAID, USGS and other 
civilian organizations will employ efforts to influence the Afghan Government, and its 
numerous entities, to positively reinforce mining and increase their relationships with 
foreign investors and mining companies.  Critical254 to this phase’s success are the 
entities embedded at Afghanistan’s national levels and their ability to ensure the natural 
and mineral resources are purchased from those conducting mining.  Decisive to this 
phase’s success is USSOF’s ability to enable mining at the local levels in Afghanistan.  
Success during Phase I will occur when the majority of USSOF VSO elements are 
embedded in Afghan villages, supporting local mining efforts and setting conditions for 
larger mining initiatives.  The desired effects for Phase I are: 
1. USSOF VSO elements receive requests for small-scale mining assistance 
from Afghan communities.  
                                                 
253 This thesis defines supporting or supporting efforts as shaping operations that “…establish 
conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain.” 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, Glossary 6.  
254 This thesis defines “critical” in terms of a critical requirement, which is defined as “An essential 
condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 5-0, 
Joint Operation Planning, GL-8.  
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2. Afghans begin selling fewer natural and mineral resources to black 
markets for illegal cross-border trade with the desire to sell them directly 
to investors.  
3. The Afghan government, DoS, USAID, USSOF, USGS and TFBSO 
receive international inquiries regarding small-scale mining initiatives in 
Afghanistan and the purchase of natural and mineral resources.  
4. USSOF experiences increased access to areas that were previously 
inaccessible and rich in natural and mineral resources.  
5. The Afghan government increases its efforts to complete the Afghan 
Mining Law, specifically as it relates to the Resource Network Strategy.  
6. The amount of HUMINT USSOF receives from Afghans regarding enemy 
disposition, composition, strength and activities increases due to local 
desires to conducting uninterrupted mining.  
During Phase II a consortium of international mining firms (and investors) will 
support the decisive effort: the Afghan government, DoS, USSOCOM, USAID, USGS 
and TFBSO will implement programs to promote and develop small-scale mining in 
Afghanistan.  The decisive point is when consortiums of mining firms (and investors) 
have initiated programs that directly and indirectly support, promote and develop small-
scale mining efforts.  USSOF at the village and national levels, USAID, the DoS, TFBSO 
and USGS will continue supporting all mining efforts.  At the village level, USSOF 
VSO elements and their military and civilian enablers will continue to support mining, 
and employ efforts towards the advancement of rural development, while still advising 
and assisting the ALP.  Critical to the succes of this phase will be when Afghans 
conducting small-scale mining see growth in their own monetary, social, and political 
capital.  Decisive success will be achieved when small-scale mining efforts are 
sustainable and increase due to the Afghans’ monetary, social, and political gains.  
Overall success during Phase II will occur when consortia of international mining firms  
(and investors) are supporting and involved with small-scale mining in Afghanistan and 
the local populations agree to their involvement.  The desired effects for Phase II are as 
follows: 
1. International mining firms commit human and physical resources at 
national and local level to support, enable and increase small-mining 
efforts.  
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2. USSOF elements observe increases in Afghan community involvment 
with, and support of, small-scale mining. 
3. The amount of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) USSOF receives from 
Afghans regarding enemy disposition, composition, strength and activities 
increases due to local desires to conducting uninterrupted mining. 
4. Infrastructure and socio-economic development increase at the Afghan 
village level.   
5.  Enemy-initiated activities decrease due to mining becoming a higher 
priority and more lucrative means of survival.  
6. Enemy forces reconcile and become miners, or seek employment in the 
ALP forces.  
*Note: the desired effects from Phase I continue for Phase II.  
 
Phase III is aimed at achieving long-term success in Afghanistan as the country 
experiences increases in its own economic, social and economic independence, and 
legitimization.  This phase will experience improved security conditions and the 
emerging economies of scope created by a thriving small-scale mining sector, making it 
possible to initiate large economy-of-scale commercial mining initiatives.  The decisive 
effort of this phase will be made by the Afghan government.  The Afghan government 
will continue to promote and support small-scale mining, and enable and support the 
transition from small- to large-scale mining, and large-scale mining itself. The decisive 
point of this phase is when small- and large-scale mining become the most influential 
factor in Afghanistan’s increases in economic, social and political capital.  USSOCOM, 
USAID, the DoS, USGS and TFBSO will continue supporting mining efforts at national 
levels in Afghanistan.   
USSOF VSO elements and their enablers will transition from acting as promoters 
of mining to advocating for local communities during their dealings with mining firms 
and the government.  Critical to the success of this phase is when the majority of 
Afghans experience economic, social and political benefits that are directly or indirectly 
related to mining, reinforcing their continued support of mining.  Decisive to the success 
of this phase are the Afghans sustaining their own economic, social and political growth 
with relatively little international dependence.  Success during this phase will be 
achieved when the country is able to handle its political, economic, and social situations 
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with relatively little external assistance. Furthermore, success and the desired effects of 
this phase are directly tied to the overarching goals and objectives of the Resource 
Network Strategy.  
Risks. The strategic benefits of this strategy far outweigh the tactical and 
operational risks. Politically, this strategy answers the basic question asked by many: 
“What is the US’s long-term strategy in Afghanistan?”  Utilizing USSOF and civilian 
networks at the local and national levels, the U.S. will promote and help to increase 
Afghan economic, social, and political capital through mining, starting with the country’s 
periphery “one village at a time.”  When conditions are set, USSOF will transition 
towards supporting larger-scale mining initiatives and advocate for the Afghans at the 
village level.  Militarily, this strategy provides USSOF with a longer-term vision in 
Afghanistan with a purpose that greatly reinforces and provides a stronger reasoning for 
their current lines of operation: promoting governance, enhancing security, and 
developing infrastructure. Economically, Afghanistan will leverage its own human and 
physical resources to develop itself economically, socially and politically, relying on 
international support much less.  Additionally, the U.S. will no longer be required to 
commit billions of dollars annually and tens of thousands of forces towards its efforts in 
Afghanistan.   
1. End-state   
This strategy is intended to accomplish the goals and objectives outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter; and the strategic, or political, military and economic effects 
addressed in phases I through III.  Furthermore, the application of this strategy aligns 
with USSOCOM’s 2013 Global SOF Network255 initiative by maintaining a presence 
and influence in areas less governed in Afghanistan.  
                                                 
255 The Commander of USSOCOM, Admiral William H. McRaven, in his posture statement to the 
113th Congress House Armed Services Committee on March 6, 2013, stated that he directed “the joint 
force [USSOF] to capitalize on networks and inter-dependency to maximize effectiveness in deterrence and 
evolving war” and that he “envisions a globally postured Joint Force… that quickly combine(s) capabilities 
with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational 
affiliations.” Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN Commander, United States Special 
Operations Command before the 113th Congress House Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong., 2013, 
accessed October 7, 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130306/100394/HHRG-113-AS00-
Wstate-McRavenUSNA-20130306.pdf.  
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2. “Military” End-state   
The insurgency in Afghanistan will be forced to make strategic decisions. 
Insurgents who seek to disrupt Afghan mining efforts, and the locals’ ability to increase 
their social, economic and political capital, will very likely be repelled by the Afghans.256  
And, if Afghan locals cannot repel them, insurgent formations or conventional force 
mobilizations will become easy targets for U.S. airpower.  This will restrict the 
insurgency’s freedom of movement, influence, and ability to control numerous portions 
of Afghanistan.  Members of the insurgency will be naturally given the opportunity to 
reconcile with the Afghans to increase their own social, economic, and political capital 
through mining.  Friendly forces will have significant leverage over and influence on 
Afghanistan’s populations through their ability and willingness to support Afghan mining 
efforts.  Additionally, USSOF VSO elements and their enablers will have the definite 
advantage of information dominance over the insurgents through networking and 
legitimate access to numerous areas of Afghanistan.  The human terrain, the Afghans 
themselves, will be provided with powerful incentives to govern, secure, and develop 
their areas and villages due to the political, economic, and social capital gained from 
mining.  Security over the physical terrain will increase.  As Afghans’ desire to engage in 
mining increases, locals will very likely increase their efforts to secure the natural and 
mineral resource-rich terrain and other areas where mining and its related activities occur.  
                                                 
256 Often times military commanders (Army, Marines or ground component commanders) expect to 
achieve an end-state with regard to the enemy, friendly forces, and the human and physical terrain. 
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Figure 11.  An illustration of the strategic concept for the Resource Network Strategy. 
D. DETAILS OF STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS BY PHASE 
This section of the Resource Network Strategy amplifies on Phases I through III 
detailing several essential activities and their related details.  The three core and highly 
influential concepts and principles of networking, economics, and information 
dominance, remain intertwined throughout these activities.  Furthermore, “the devil is in 
the details,” and this section describes how each phase will be implemented, what is 
expected to be achieved, and what problems are likely to arise. 
1. Phase I 
Phase I will be initiated by USSOF VSO elements shifting their networks of 
influence and physical locations to regions of Afghanistan with the greatest potential for 
natural resource development.  These shifts must be suitable, acceptable, and effective in 
order to promote the success of this strategy.  Many activities must occur in order to 
enable, support and ensure the effective of this stategy’s application in Afghanistan.  
 87 
Command and control cells of 20-30 personnel will be established to ensure this 
strategic shift’s effectiveness.  USSOF-led command and control cells will monitor, 
synchronize, coordinate, enable and advise these strategic shifts.  Each cell must include: 
1. A command element, with the cell commander and deputy commander. 
2. A “mining team,” with one metallurgist, one mining engineer, and three 
geologists. 
3. A “government liaison team,” with an economist, lawyer, aid specialist, 
and diplomat. 
4. A “business liaison team,” with personnel from the TFBSO and 
representatives of international mining firms. 
5. A “special operations team,” with a group of personnel familiar with the 
planning, programming, and execution of VSO operations. 
6. A “development team,” with civil affairs personnel and USAID 
representatives. 
7. A resident “scholar” tasked to conduct academic research and assure that 
invaluable knowledge that could be gained for future use is collected and 
analyzed throughout the operations. 
After command and control cells are established, the most favorable VSO sites 
must be identified.  These sites must be the first locations toward which USSOF will 
shift.  Potential and high-priority sites that USSOF VSO element make their initial shifts 
toward will be rated on a number of essential criteria:  
1. Areas where the local Afghan community supports the establishment of a 
USSOF VSO element and either accepts its associated ALP units, or is 
willing to offer ALP recruits for follow-on security duties, must be 
considered a priority.  VSO sites should not be established in opposition to 
the wishes of the local population.   
2. VSO sites must be established in areas where small-scale artisanal mining 
is either already underway or economically viable.  
3. VSO sites must be established where large-scale commercial deposits are 
present.   
4. VSO sites must be established where infrastructure like roads and the 
power grid are accessible.   
5. Preference should be given to potential VSO sites that already host a 
USSOF VSO element.  In practice, no particular site is likely to be ideal in 
terms of all five criteria, and tradeoffs will have to be made. 
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In addition, several other factors must be weighed.  In areas that already have 
vibrant small-scale mining sectors, the technical challenges involved in the promotion of 
the artisanal sector are relatively easy to overcome—a lot of people already know where 
deposits are and have some skill in mining.  On the other hand, such mining is almost 
invariably illegal, and there is no particular reason to assume that those exploiting a 
deposit are those with the best claim to it.  At such sites, difficult and sensitive 
negotiations may be required to sort out ownership, avoid getting entangled in local 
feuds, safeguard the interest of local villagers, and ensure enforcement of Afghan laws.  
At other candidate sites, there may be no active artisanal mining.  This complicates the 
technical challenges, but mitigates the legal challenges and the potential danger of 
USSOF VSO elements becoming involved in local feuds. 
Another issue relates to security conditions at proposed sites.  Some sites are 
likely to be in relatively secure areas, while others are in regions that are highly contested 
by insurgents.  The former has the attraction of allowing a small force to achieve a lot in 
terms of promoting mining quickly and with minimal casualties.  The latter has the 
attraction of being an area where insurgents are likely to be profiting from illegal mining.  
In such areas, USSOF VSO and ALP force deployments in these areas can deny the 
enemy access to financial resources and reduce their influence on the local Afghan 
populations.  Offsetting that, operations at such sites are likely to be much more 
difficult—more kinetic resources will have to provided, the use of civilian mining and aid 
specialists will be constrained, and higher losses will be sustained by Coalition forces.  
Yet another complication is how to handle regions like Aynak, where a Chinese 
mining firm has established a claim that it has yet to exploit.  Politically, it is simply not 
viable for Coalition forces to appear to be fighting and suffering losses in order to 
safeguard profits that flow to Chinese firms.  As such, I recommend that such areas be 
ruled out as candidate sites.  If, however, the Chinese want to provide security in such 
areas and make the Afghans’ benefits a priority, we should cooperate with their efforts.  




insurgency (or the Islamic political arm) will very likely strike, making the benefits of 
Chinese mining not worth their costs, much like what has already occurred while mining 
at Aynak.257 
Once the locations of desirable USSOF VSO sites are determined, it will then be 
necessary to plan and execute the strategic shift of forces.  This involves three 
elements—one that is relatively easy to achieve and two that are potentially very difficult.  
The easy element is to obtain formal invitations and lay the groundwork for the 
establishment of new VSO sites.  This should be simple because USSOF VSO elements 
have already done this many times.  Thus sites will be in areas where locals would have 
been notified in advance, and the program to promote artisanal mining will greatly 
enhance the attractiveness of hosting a VSO site.   
More difficult, however, will be the arrangements required to depart existing VSO 
sites.258  Such sites should not be simply abandoned.  That would put at risk the hard-
fought gains that they have made in enhancing security in their regions.  It would also 
blacken the reputation of the VSO/ALP program.  Unfortunately, the USSOF VSO 
elements have little experience with transitioning, or shutting down, VSO/ALP sites.  
Numerous options are available for USSOF transitioning, as opposed to abandoning, 
VSO sites that are not in close proximity to heavily mineralized areas:  
1. USSOF may completely transition VSO sites to Afghan SOF, which are 
units similar to the U.S. Army Green Berets, and have operated in 
Afghanistan for over three years.  
2. USSOF may transition VSO sites to Afghan SOF and leave behind small 
advisory and assistance cells of 4-6 personnel. 
3. USSOF transition VSO sites to Afghan SOF and provide them with an 
appropriate amount of oversight and assistance from other village 
locations. 
                                                 
257 Jessica Donati and Mirwais Harooni, “Exclusive—Chinese Halt at Flagship Mine Imperils Afghan 
Future,” Reuters, September 27, 2012, accessed October 7, 2013, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/uk-afghanistan-aynak-idUKBRE88Q0XL20120927. 
258 In September 2012, 36 of 99 (or 37 percent) VSO/ALP sites were located farther than 60 
kilometers away from one of the USGS’s AOIs or areas with high potential for natural and mineral 
resources. The remaining 63 percent of VSO/ALP sites were located either within 60 kilometers of or 
inside of one of the USGS’s AOIs or other areas with high potential for natural and minerals resources.  
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4. USSOF conduct VSO in one village while living in another village, 
spending 50 percent of their time in each village. 
5. USSOF establish mobile advisory teams that move from village to village 
conducting VSO for two to four days at a time.  These teams would be 
assigned to a single Afghan province or half of a province to maintain 
continuity, familiarity with the area, and rapport with the locals.  
USSOF VSO teams, while operating within any one of the aforementioned 
conditions, may offer the benefit of employment and increased social, economic and 
political capital through mining for sites where they had previously conducted VSO as a 
point of leverage to maintain rapport with, and access to, the village.  
Another difficult task will be to influence the Afghan government in order to gain 
approvals and commitments of support for efforts being planned at different sites.  
USSOF and DoS personnel located in Kabul must immediately initiate efforts to 
influence Afghan President Karzai and key leaders to support USSOF VSO teams 
transitioning to areas with abundant natural and mineral resources.  Additionally, the 
Afghan government must be offered some type of benefit to allow this strategic shift of 
USSOF VSO elements.  
In addition to a strategic shift of the USSOF VSO network, it will be necessary to 
rethink the current VSO/ALP approach.  The new VSO/ALP “package” will still follow 
the proven methodology currently in place—following an invitation, a team made up of 
USSOF assets and enablers will embed in a village; establish a physical VSO site; recruit, 
train and employ a local ALP security force; promote effective governance; and engage 
in associated efforts to develop a good working relationship with local communities. 
USSOF VSO elements, however, will have a very different composition and 
“feel” than they currently have.  USSOF will remain in the lead element at the VSO sites 
because physical security will always be the prerequisite for all other planned activities, 
but while USSOF continue to lead, the VSO elements will incorporate personnel from 
Civil Affairs and the TFBSO, DoD civilians, USAID development personnel, USGS 
geologists, and also select Afghan military and civilian personnel.  
This new format will require a change in the operational culture that surrounds the 
VSO program.  To facilitate that change, I propose a number of steps.   
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1. Rename the VSO teams “CMETs” (Civil-Military Enabling Teams).  This 
will help reinforce the image of the teams as being a non-kinetic force 
whose primary task is the enabling of mining and economic development.  
“CMET” sounds a lot less “kinetic” than Special Forces Operational 
Detachment—Alpha (SFODA), Marine Special Operations Team 
(MSOT), or SEAL platoon. 
While this change of image will enhance the attractiveness of the teams in 
Afghan eyes, it will first and foremost help USSOF personnel to 
understand that the success of the mission they are undertaking will not be 
measured by the number of insurgents killed, but by the amount of 
economic and social progress made.  (From this point of the thesis, and 
forward, the combined USSOF-led teams will be referred to as CMETs.)  
2. Modify the CMET’s appearance. CMET uniforms should change to 
(where appropriate) either Afghan or U.S. civilian attire.  The visibility of 
rank and insignia should be much less obvious, i.e. Special Forces, Ranger 
and Airborne patches, and baseball hats with skulls and crossbones should 
not be worn.  Weaponry should be made to appear as civilian and non-
kinetic as is feasible, which may mean keeping the M240B and M2 (.50 
caliber) machine guns, M249 SAWs (Squad Automatic Weapons) and 
40mm grenade launchers out of site as appropriate.  However, radios must 
be maintained within close proximity for situations when USSOF’s 
“lightly armed” appearance draws attacks and U.S. airpower must be 
summoned to ensure that all Afghans have a clear understanding that VSO 
elements have a significant amount of “reachback.”  
3. All military personnel assigned to CMETs should be required to complete 
a short one or two week course that exposes them to geology, natural 
resource economics, and village level development.  This will help them 
understand what we are trying to do with the CMET program, and how 
they fit into it.   
While CMETs conduct their strategic shift, the command cell—with high level 
assistance from NATO government—will recruit major “world class” mining firms to 
join a consortium that will promote and supervise artisanal mining efforts.  Criteria for 
inclusion in the consortium would include experience with both marquee mining projects 
and in the problems of artisanal mining activities, a strong environmental track record, a 
good reputation in terms of corruption, and incorporation in a country that belongs or 
works closely with the Coalition.  Candidate firms would include BHP Billiton, Rio 
Tinto, Vendanta, Anglo-American, Vale, Barrick, and Newmont. Although they are huge, 
these firms know all about artisanal mining.  For example, in Ghana, Newmont has 
established “a linkage programme around the Ahafo mine in order to maximize to 
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business opportunities for local SMMEs (Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises) as well 
as more broadly to seek means to increase local incomes.”259 And, Aglo American and 
its subsidiary, Anglo Gold, have been involved with small-scale artisanal mining and 
their communties in Ghana since the early 1980s.260   
These firms would form an entity that would provide technical assistance and 
capital to artisanal miners, training and internships to potential mining personnel, and 
assistance in the establishment of processing and logistics facilities.  While the effort may 
or may not be directly profitable to these firms, the sums involved would be trivial for 
them as a group.  Offsetting this, these firms would earn a lot of good public relations and 
international goodwill, while strengthening both their understanding of Afghanistan—and 
hence their ability to judge the viability of the future large-scale projects—and their 
experience in working with Afghans and the Afghan government.  
Bringing these firms on board achieves three things. First, the U.S. military and 
the Coalition do not have to become directly involved in mining.  This makes the mission 
easier to accomplish.  Second, these firms will do a far better job of promoting artisanal 
mining—they have the required experience.  Third and, perhaps, most important, the 
entry of these firms into Afghanistan is a long-term strategic goal of the Afghan 
government, and if the Ministry of Mines and Ministry of Finance see involvement by 
marquee international mining firms in the Resource Network Strategy, they are far more 
likely to support the overall effort.261 
 
                                                 
259 C. M. Rogerson, “Mining Enterprise and Partnership for Socio-economic Development,” African 
Journal of Business Management, 4, 14 (July 18, 2011): 5413, accessed October 11, 2013, 
http://academicjournals.org/AJBM.  
260 Alan Roe and Jonathan Samuel, “Ghana, Country Case Study: The Challenge of Mineral Wealth: 
Using Resource Endowments to Foster Sustainable Development,” July 2007, International Council on 
Mining & Metals, accessed October 12, 2013, http://www.icmm.com/document/301.  
261 Tarek Ghani, September 17, 2013, comment on this thesis to Dr. Jonathan Lipow, an advisor for 
this thesis. UC Berkeley, CA. Tarek Ghani is a Ph.D. candidate in Business and Public Policy at UC 
Berkeley’s Haas School of Business, a native Afghan, and the son of Ashraf Ghani. Ashraf Ghani was the 
former chancellor of Kabul University, worked for the World Bank on international development and 
assistance, and was Afghanistan’s Minister of Finance from 2002 through 2004. Ashraf Ghani is the current 
Chairman for the Institute for State Effectiveness, which was established in Afghanistan in 2005 to improve 
states’ ability to serve their citizens.  
 93 
2. Phase II 
During Phase II a consortium of international mining firms (and investors) will 
has been established and the CMETs have shifted their networks of influence and 
established a secure environment, Phase II—the promotion of artisanal mining—will 
commence.  Civilian employees drawn from the mining consortium will embed with the 
CMETs and begin providing technical assistance, credit, training, and market access 










Figure 12.  The top left picture is an example of artisanal mining in Mes Aynak, Logar 
Province Afghanistan.  The top right picture illustrates an Afghan coal miner’s 
hands in Karkar Province, Afghanistan.  The bottom left picture illustrates 
“illegal” artisanal mining in Afghanistan.  The bottom right picture illustrates an 
Afghan man using dynamite, an old and unsophisticated mining technique.262 
While the private sector becomes involved in mining, the CMETs—while 
continuing to provide security and train ALP forces—will also expand their efforts to  
 
                                                 
262 The top left picture was illustrated by Brent Huffman on May 17, 2012, “Are Chinese Miners 
Destroying a 2,000-Year-Old Buddhist Site in Afghanistan?,” Asia Society (blog), August 28, 2013, 
http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/are-chinese-miners-destroying-2000-year-old-buddhist-site-afghanistan-
images; the top right pictures was illustrated in Cheryl Benard, “Afghanistan’s Mineral Wealth Could Be a 
Bonananza-or Lead to Disaster,” The Daily Beast, July 4, 2012, Thedailybeast.com, accessed on August 28, 
2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/04/afghanistan-s-mineral-wealth-could-be-a-bonanza-
or-lead-to-disaster.html; the bottom left picture was illustrated by in a RAWA News article, “Afghan 
‘Geological Reserves Worth a Trillion Dollars.’ The War-ravaged Nation Could Become One of the 
Richest in the World if Helped to Tap its Geological Deposits, Karzai Told Reporters,” Rawa News, 
accessed August 28, 2013, http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2010/01/31/afghan-geological-reserves-
worth-a-trillion-dollars.html; the bottom right picture was illustrated in Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, “Tapping 
into Afghanistan’s Wealth of Gems,” NPR, September 7, 2007, accessed on August 28, 2013, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14239357.  
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promote local development and create a positive environment for cooperation between 
villagers, the Afghan government, and international mining firms.  I propose a number of 
initiatives: 
Electronic Financial Payments (EFT).  All residents will be provided a biometric 
smart card that will be used as a means of distributing the revenues generated by the 
mining operation via EFT. The smart cards will allow villagers to make purchases and 
sales via smart card at their local markets and can be used to pay mine workers, suppliers 
and—potentially—ALP personnel.  The smart cards will eventually be enabled to allow 
villagers to make purchases using them in major population centers, or at a minimum, 
withdraw cash from bank branches.  A basket of financial services will be offered to 
holders of smart cards, including micro-credit, micro-insurance, and savings vehicles.  
The smart cards will also serve as ID cards, and will also be able to store additional data 
for other applications, such as health care and security.   
The introduction of biometric EFT will lower transaction costs for villagers, 
increasing their effective living standards and market integration.  It will provide access 
to new types of financial goods that enhance welfare.  It will eliminate the need for cash 
transfers and the resultant corruption and security problems.  It will provide an electronic 
“window” into the workings of the village that can be valuable to the CMET team.  It will 
also lay the groundwork for greater economic integration at the national level. 
The system I suggest be considered is the Universal Electronic Payment Systems 
(UEPS) currently used primarily in South Africa, Ghana, and Iraq.263  This system is 
proven, and while compatible with the mobile telephone based systems that are now quite 
                                                 
263 Elly Okutoyi, “Zimbabwe Unveils Country’s First Universal Electronic Payment System,” 
Humaniop: Home to African Tech, May 25, 2013, accessed August 25, 2013, 
http://www.humanipo.com/news/484/Zimbabwe-unveils-countrys-first-universal-electronic-payment-
system; Ross J. Anderson, “The Formal Verification of a Payment System” (unpublished manuscript, 
Computer Laboratory: Cambridge, UK, 2006), accessed on September 9, 2013, 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/uepsbook.pdf; “South African Supreme Court of Appeal Rules in 
Favor of SASSA and Net1,” Marketwire, March 27, 2013, accessed September 10, 2013, 
http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/south-african-supreme-court-of-appeal-rules-in-favor-of-sassa-
and-net1-nasdaq-ueps-1772619.htm; “Smart Card Payment System Launched in Iraq,” Omni-channel 
Retailing, accessed September 10, 2013, http://omni-channelretailing.com/item.php?news_id=6436.  
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popular, it can also operate in areas where there is no connectivity, cellular service, or 
even access to the power grid.  The system is shown in Figure 13.  
Most importantly, the UEPS system has incorporated many measures that make it 
highly secure.  For example, UEPS cardholders can confirm their identity with a 
fingerprint from any of their fingers.    The card owner, however, chooses one finger to 
be a distress finger (only known by him/her), and if he is forced to make a transaction 
with his smart-card while in distress, or against his will, the card reader will show that the 
user’s balance is very insignificant, or that funds are not available, while alerting 
authorities as soon as possible that the card holder is in trouble.  Additionally, card 
readers will not work if the person is dead or the finger has been detached from their 




Figure 13.  A UEPS Terminal and Cards.264 
USAID is ideally suited to be the lead agency in the promotion of EFT. The effort 
would fit into the Agency’s “Better than Cash Alliance” initiative, a USAID organized 
collaborative effort of non-profits and firms like Citibank and VISA that works to 
promote EFT in developing countries.   
3. Connectivity   
VSO elements currently bring a satellite broadband capability with them.  So 
would CMETs.  I propose that this capability be leveraged by offering villagers access to 
broadband through the establishment of “internet cafes” that piggyback on the VSO 
element’s capability.  A website will be established for the village in order to share news, 
discuss problems and opportunities, and provide the CMET team with an additional 
electronic window into the workings of the village (see Figure 14). 
                                                 




Figure 14.  An example of an Afghan Village Website.  
Distance learning opportunities could also be exploited in order to facilitate 
certificate training courses that will be required for those involved in mining activities. 
Indeed, there is no reason why distance learning should not be harnessed to facilitate 
ALP training as well. 
Establish 4G Cellular Networks.  In areas currently lacking 4G service, the CMET 
would work to establish such service, and issue smart phones to the local population. 
These phones will greatly aid in facilitating mining activity.  They also enhance local 
security in a number of novel ways.  First, Afghan villagers can use them to capture 
images of insurgent or criminal activity in their villages.  Second, the phones provide a 
geo-location capability that would allow the CMET to monitor the location of the local 
population and identify people in distress or need of assistance.  Third, they once again 
enhance the CMET’s electronic window, or Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), into the 
village in which it is embedded. 
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4. Phase III 
Phase III.  Once (i) security is firmly established in areas with major resource 
endowments, and the Afghan locals are primarily responsible for and capable of 
maintaining it; (ii) a thriving artisanal mining sector has developed; and (iii) international 
mining firms have developed a good level of understanding of the opportunities and 
challenges of working in Afghanistan, it will be possible to commence Phase III of the 
Resource Network Strategy.  In Phase III, the Afghan Ministry of Mines will begin to 
aggressively issue tenders for various small- and large-scale mining projects (see Figure 








Figure 15.  The top left picture illustrates a small-scale mining project in Bamyan 
Province, Afghanistan. The top right picture illustrates a small-scale mining 
activity in Afghanistan. The bottom left picture illustrates Afghans mining at the 
Abkhorak mine in northern Afghanistan. The bottom right picture illustrates gold 
mining at Nooraba/Samti in north Afghanistan on the Panj River.265 
                                                 
265 The top left picture is of a small-scale mining project in Bamyan Province, Afghanistan provided 
by Graham Bowley, “Potential for a Mining Boom Splits Factions in Afghanistan,” New York Times [Asia 
Pacific], September 8, 2012, accessed October 13, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/world/asia/afghans-wary-as-efforts-pick-up-to-tap-mineral-
riches.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. The top right pictures is an illustration of small-scale mining activity 
in Afghanistan provided by Dion Nissenbaum, “Afghan Mining Wealth Thwarted by Delays,” Wall Street 
Journal, June 14, 2012, accessed October 13, 2008, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/wall-street-
journal/afghanistan-mining-wealth-thwarted-by-delays/story-fnay3ubk-1226395155692#. The bottom left 
picture is an illustration of Afghans working the Abkhorak mine in northern Afghanistan provided by Ali 
M. Latifi, “Afghan Mines among the World’s Most Dangerous. Afghanistan has a Huge Mineral Deposit, 
but the Underground Wealth is Unlikely to Enrich Vulnerable Workers,” Aljazeera: In Depth, September 
15, 2013, accessed October 13, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/09/201391515580675531.html. The bottom right picture is 
an illustration of gold mining at Nooraba/Samti in north Afghanistan on the Panj River provided by System 
for Monitoring Law Enforcement of Informal Mining [SYMIN], “Service Trials: Gold Mining,” accessed 
October 13, 2013, http://www3.gaf.de/symin/service-trials. 
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At the CMET level, three things will take place during Phase III. First, the 
international mining firms will phase out their assistance to the artisanal mining sector, as 
they transition towards involvement in large-scale projects.  While the artisanal sector 
should be more or less self-sustaining by this time, it is possible that certain gaps may 
need to be filled by the CMETs on an ad hoc basis.   
Second, CMETs will transition from being promoters of mining activity to acting 
as defenders of local interests in dealings with the international mining firms and the 
Afghan central government.  This will mitigate the risk that the advent of commercial 
mining, rather than uniting Afghanistan, will instead drive local communities to engage 
in insurgency in order to defend their region from rapacious mining activity. 
Finally, as major mining projects get under way, CMETs will begin to withdraw.  
In some areas, it may be possible to simply shut down sites.  In other areas, the site may 
be fully civilianized and taken over by aid workers.  In many areas, however, a military 
presence will still be required, and the role played by the SOF will gradually be 
transitioned to select Afghan National Army personnel trained specifically for the 
Resource Network Strategy mission.  At that point, the Coalition will have won the war 
in Afghanistan. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Revenue from commercial mining projects will allow the Afghans to end their 
reliance on foreign aid, will begin to promote genuine industrial socioeconomic 
development, and will engender economic conditions at the national level that will 
undermine any remaining pockets of insurgency remaining in the country.266 
The tactics and skills developed in implementing the Resource Network Strategy 
will, however, still remain relevant to U.S. national security.  For example, the effort in 
Afghanistan could act as a template for a similar effort to secure the resource rich frontier 
areas of Pakistan.  Indeed, at some stage, the Pakistanis should be invited to join in the 
Afghanistan effort in order to develop the experience required to make the approach work 
                                                 
266 Peter Berck and Jonathan Lipow. “Did Monetary Forces Help Turn the Tide in Iraq?” Defense & 
Security Analysis 26, no. 2 (July 2010). 
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in their country.  Securing the Northwest Frontier Province and the FATA would 
constitute a decisive victory in the Global War on Terror whose importance may 
transcend that of any achievements made in Afghanistan.  Finally, the approach 
developed in Afghanistan may be applicable farther afield.  Perhaps U.S. and NATO 
forces experienced in the implementation of the Resource Network Strategy could team 
up with, for example, the African Union’s peace keeping forces to secure the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and other resource rich areas that are plagued by insurgency and 
criminal activity.   
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VI. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since the United States entered Afghanistan following the attacks of 9/11, 
America and its allies have expended a significant amount of blood, treasure, and time in 
an attempt to stabilize this troubled land.  After 12 long and painful years, however, it is 
difficult to identify any lasting achievements that can be associated with this effort.  
Many observers believe that the Taliban’s return to power is imminent.  There are reports 
that thousands of Afghans are leaving areas no longer under NATO military control. 
Thousands of American troops deployed to Afghanistan continue to achieve hard fought 
tactical victories and only occasionally experience operational successes, but fail to alter 
the course of the war.  Given the stakes involved—America’s reputation, NATO’s sense 
of confidence, Pakistan’s internal stability—a new long-term vision (and associated 
strategy) of Afghanistan’s future and America’s role in it is required. 
In this thesis, I explored the possibility of introducing a new counterinsurgency 
and nation-building strategy—the “Resource Network Strategy”—that leverages 
Afghanistan’s natural resource endowment and the USSOF’s village stability operations 
(VSO) networks, methodologies, and capabilities in order to secure Afghanistan and 
promote a virtuous circle of long term economic and political development with a 
minimal commitment of American lives and money.  At its core, this strategy focuses on 
each Afghan as a rational individual, and seeks to offer that individual an alternative that 
will provide greater benefits than can be gained by passively or actively supporting the 
Taliban insurgency.   
The starting point in my analysis was to ask what the United States is actually 
trying to achieve in Afghanistan.  In Chapter V, I offered a set of goals that that I believe 
represent a reasonable—if optimistic—set of objectives that, if achieved, would result in 
the campaign in Afghanistan being recognized by friend and foe alike as an unambiguous 
victory.  The goals were:   
1. Afghanistan poses no terrorist or insurgent threat to any other country.  
2. Afghanistan is not faced with any meaningful internal security threat. 
3. Afghanistan safeguards group rights for all of its communities. 
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4. Afghanistan safeguards the individual rights for all of its citizens in a 
manner consistent with the spirit of the United Nation’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
5. The economic and social dynamic in Afghanistan assures the long-term 
sustainability of the achievements outlined above. 
6. Foreign military intervention is not required to maintain the status quo. 
This Resource Network Strategy was designed to offer decision makers a sound 
strategic concept that could realistically offer NATO and the Afghan government an 
opportunity to make considerable progress towards these six goals.  This strategy’s 
objectives are to: 
1. Deny insurgents access to revenue currently being earned from illegal 
mining.  
2. Create significant and sustainable economic incentives for local regions 
that cooperate with Coalition forces and assist in defeating insurgents in 
their area.  
3. Physically secure high value mining areas.   
4. Promote the small-scale artisanal mining industry.  
5. Increase awareness and understanding in the international mining industry 
regarding opportunities in Afghanistan.   
6. Promote economic interdependence and integration between different 
Afghan communities, and between communities and the central 
government of Afghanistan.   
How will the Resource Network Strategy achieve these objectives?  The strategy 
is divided into three overlapping phases.  In Phase I, the USSOF will shift its networks of 
VSO influence and locations into areas endowed with considerable natural resources.  
The VSO methodology incorporates: (i) recruiting, training and advising thousands of 
“home-grown” security forces, which are today referred to as ALP; (ii) promotion and 
support of local governance; and (iii) development of local infrastructure.  The success of 
VSO sites depends on the support of the local population, and these sites are only 
established if there is a good chance that such support will be forthcoming.   What the 
Resource Network Strategy adds to the existing VSO approach is the ability to offer local 
populations that host VSO sites the opportunity to exploit natural resources in their area 
that will greatly enhance their wealth, and do so in a sustainable fashion.  
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Following the establishment of security at each new VSO site, Phase II of the 
Resource Network Strategy will commence.  In Phase II, a consortium of international 
mining firms and internationally recognized NGOs will—with assistance from Afghan 
and American government entities (USAID, USGS, TFBSO, Afghanistan Ministry of 
Mines, etc.) will implement a program to promote the establishment of a safe and 
environmentally responsible small-scale artisanal mining industry in Afghanistan.  This 
will raise local living standards and strengthen local institutions.  At the same time, the 
experience gained through small-scale efforts will have paved the way for larger 
industrial scale mining projects.  Once such projects become economically feasible, 
Phase III will commence. 
In Phase III, the Afghan government will issue tenders for large-scale industrial 
mining projects in areas that have been secured and developed during Phases I and II.  At 
this point, the VSO forces and the NGOs involved in promotion of artisanal mining will 
transition from being promoters of mining to being advocates of local interests, assuring 
that development of marque mines does not engender hostility that rekindles insurgency. 
Based on the USGS’s 2011 report on Afghanistan’s mineral endowments, I 
identified 24 areas of interest where the USGS had validated and identified the locations, 
types and estimated amounts of natural and mineral resources for production 
opportunities in Afghanistan.  These areas are spread relatively evenly throughout the 
country.   Several of these areas are in close proximity current VSO sites, have ALP 
currently operating within close proximity to them, and their security levels offer low- to 
medium-risk, making these areas logical places to start implementation of the Resource 
Network Strategy.   
Based on the projected requirement to secure all 24 areas of interest, the Resource 
Network Strategy assumes that the current USSOF deployment in Afghanistan—
currently capable of manning and supporting 100 VSO sites will remain in-theatre 
following NATO withdrawal at the end of 2014.  In addition, I calculated that an 
additional cell would have to be established at Special Operations—Afghanistan 
headquarters in Kabul to support the Resource Network Strategy.  This cell would require  
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20–30 personnel, and would coordinate USSOF efforts with those of the Afghan 
government, other American agencies such as USAID and the TFBSO, NGOs, and 
mining firms involved in the initiative.   
In addition to changes in the location of VSO deployments, implementation of the 
Resource Network Strategy requires several changes in how VSO operations are 
conducted.  First, attention has to be paid to re-orienting USSOF’s understanding of its 
mission, as well as the image that it projects to the Afghans.  Special Operations 
personnel need to understand that their ultimate objective is to promote development in 
the region in which they operate—not engage in kinetic operations.  This requires some 
training and rebranding.  VSO personnel will need some training in mining and village 
level development economics.  The appearance of VSO teams should be civilianized (and 
“Afghanistanized”).  The VSO teams should also be renamed.  I propose calling these 
teams “CMETs” (Civil-military Enabling Teams), which will likely be perceived as much 
less offensive and “war-like.”  
Second, successful implementation of the Resource Network Strategy requires 
communications and financial infrastructure that VSO teams must provide.  These 
include mobile phone and internet access (via the VSO site’s broadband link), and the 
establishment of electronic financial payments systems to assure that the many financial 
transactions that the strategy will engender are done with maximum transparency and 
efficiency.  This electronic infrastructure also opens new opportunities for the effective 
conduct of the VSO’s security mission.  These opportunities should be exploited.  
Cellular phone usage should be tracked and monitored for intelligence purposes.  
Financial transaction records should be monitored to identify suspicious activity.  Internet 
usage should be monitored to identify who is accessing what websites.  Using this 
information, VSO teams can develop a much clearer situational awareness regarding 
developments in their areas of responsibility.  This should allow USSOF to resolve 
potential issues before they become dangerous problems. 
This briefly summarizes the proposed strategy.  In Chapter V, the full strategy 
was articulated following the guidelines of Joint Publication 5-0 (JP 5-0), Joint Operation 
Planning.  In accordance with JP 5-0, this strategy establishes and defines decisive 
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points, decisive and supporting efforts, critical requirements, success, desired effects, 
political, military and economic risks, and desired end-states.  Defining these terms, 
concepts and conditions in the context of this strategy establishes priorities for its 
deliberate and well-planned preparation and execution.   
In addition to the Resource Network Strategy itself, I gave considerable thought 
to some of the political and operational challenges and opportunities that would or could 
accompany its implementation.  Some of these insights were motivated by my own 
counterinsurgency operations experiences.  The following summarize the ideas I 
developed in the thesis:  
1. This Resource Network Strategy must be announced by senior U.S. 
officials, preferably, the President of the United States.  This will ensure 
the world understands that America is serious about achieving victory 
during the way forward in Afghanistan, and does not plan to let all the 
human and financial resources invested in the country, end in failure. 
2. USSOF must immediately focus a shift of their VSO teams, networks, and 
methodologies towards areas where this strategy is currently feasible. 
Afghans living near the Ghunday-Achin (#18)267 and Nuristan (#22) AOIs 
are conducting mining and want USSOF support for their mining activities 
(discussed in Chapter I), and USSOF must shift towards these areas.  
Other areas where mining is highly feasible, and USSOF must make their 
immediate shfts towards are the Badakshan (#2) AOI, which has low-level 
threats to security and well over 300 ALP; the Northern Takhar (#11) 
AOI, which has low-level threats to security and well over 1,100 ALP; the 
(southern) Takhar (#24) AOI, which has low-level risks to security and 
well over 100 ALP; the Dusar-Shaida-Misgaran (#5) AOI, which has 
medium-level risks to security and well over 200 ALP; the North Herat 
(#21) AOI, which has medium-levels risks to security and well over 200 
ALP; the Touramaline (#13) AOI, which has medium-level risks to 
security and over 100 ALP; the Kharnak-Kanjar (#8) AOI, which has 
medium-level risks to security and well over 200 ALP; and the Nalbandon 
(#10) AOI, which has medium-level risks to security and over 100 ALP.  
All of these AOIs have roads leading to and from them, the locals are 
either mining now or have some understanding of mining; and there is a 
significant endowment of natural and mineral resources.   
3. This is not a “get rich quick” tactical or operational level plan.  This is a 
long-term vision and effects-based strategy for an entire country, and must 
be conducted this way. Much like the Marshal Plan after World War II, 
                                                 
267 The AOI numbers addressed correspond with AOIs 1-24 illustrated in Figure 2, Chapter 1. 
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this plan will take years to see the effects of at the national level.  Afghans 
should not expect to immediately earn vast fortunes from mining.  Those 
implementing and involved in this strategy will require patience, keeping 
this strategy’s vision in their forethoughts.  
4. The Afghans must know that the United States is not planning a complete 
withdrawal from the country.  They must know that USSOF and their 
civilian counterparts are in this one for the “long haul,” which will send a 
message to the insurgents and terrorist organizations that Afghanistan is 
no longer their best option for acquiring unhindered safe haven.   
5. The Afghans (at all levels) must understand that USSOF and their civilian 
counterparts will enable and promote mining, advocate for villages and the 
country when trading their natural and minerals resources with internal 
and external buyers, and set conditions for fair and equitable distribution 
of mining-related financial gains.  
6. The strategy addresses corruption by equalizing all stakeholders involved.  
Conversely, everyone involved in the implementation of this strategy must 
accept some degree of corruption and not expect an entire country to 
change overnight. 
7. Those who implement this strategy must be chosen for their appropriate 
knowledge, capabilities, access to resources and people, and personalities.  
This means that the individuals and organizations implementing this 
strategy could potentially not align with any particular USSOF unit or 
civilian organization. 
8. Entire USSOF teams conducting VSO in Afghanistan should not be 
relieved in place or conduct transfer of authorities (also called a 
“RIPTOA”) at one time.  No matter what “systems” are in place, 
“RIPTOAs” have been a problem when entire USSOF teams have 
replaced one another in Afghanistan.  A great deal of continuity has been 
lost when highly experienced USSOF teams and their leadership depart 
Afghanistan all at once. USSOF team leadership (the Officer, Warrant 
Officer, Senior Noncommissioned Officer, and Intelligence Sergeant) and 
the subordinate team members located at an individual VSO site should 
not all be replaced at one time.  Only 50 percent of USSOF team’s 
leadership and its subordinates should be replaced during a relief in place 
or transfer of authority (“RIPTOA”), which will maintain continuous 
continuity, experience, and knowledge in the country.  
9. The U.S.’s involvement in Afghanistan must go from the “front page” of 
newspapers and media outlets to the back page.  Terrorists and insurgents 
appreciate little more than achieving the “money shot” (pictures and 
video) of an American making a mistake.  If the United States’ 
involvement in Afghanistan is less public, then these “money shots” could 
likely receive less attention and scrutiny.   
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10. American forces –both military and civilian - must maintain the ability to 
defend themselves by acquiring and employing air power (close air 
support) and employing their organic firepower.  USSOF, their civilian 
counterparts, and the Afghan locals will experience insurgent attacks, and 
must maintain the ability to defend themselves. 
11. USSOF-advised and Afghan-commando-led clearing and disruption 
operations must be discontinued, or at least be kept separate from efforts 
related to the Resource Network Strategy.  Surgical raids that pinpoint 
individuals and small area targets can be continued.  These types of 
surgical operations have proven highly effective, and are of great benefit 
strategically as they not only eliminate insurgent leaders, but also send a 
meaningful message to the insurgents and terrorists.    
12. Training must occur before USSOF teams and civilians combine their 
efforts to enable mining in Afghanistan. One to two week training courses 
must be established and required for all parties involved, which include, 
but are not limited to: the basics of mining operations, equipment 
familiarization, drilling, blasting, excavating, mineral identification, 
testing, and processing; familiarization of USSOF tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for shooting, maneuvering, communicating, and providing first 
aid, and the appropriate equipment involved; and, an overview of this 
Resource Network Strategy to ensure its clear understanding.   
13. The Status of Forces Agreement currently being negotiated must be 
aligned to protect those implementing this strategy.  USSOF and their 
civilian enablers must be ensured legal protection by the United States if 
situations arise where they face any type of due process related to actions 
Afghanistan.  Additionally, when necessary, they must maintain the ability 
to defend themselves.   
14. The United States’ involvement must no longer be referred to as a “war.”  
This terminology sends a message to the insurgents, terrorists, the Afghans 
and world that there is opportunity for conflict in the country.  Similar to 
when Operation Iraqi Freedom was renamed Operation New Dawn, 
Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan must either be renamed, or not 
named at all. Perception is reality and the United States must influence the 
perceptions of foreign involvement in Afghanistan.   
15. Training events must occur between Afghan Security Forces and the 
United States mlitary. Aside from the fact that both parties will benefit 
from each other’s training, continued access to resources and networks can 
be developed in Afghanistan, and the Afghan government and military 
will maintain and increase its legitimacy through continuous involvement 
with the United States government.   
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16. Afghan Special Forces268 (ASF) must be integrated into the CMETs 
(USSOF and their civilian enablers) at the village level as often and as 
soon as possible.  This integration will lead to several positive results, 
such as: ASF will receive real-world VSO training and experience, an 
Afghan face will be tied to every CMET action, and in the future VSO 
sites can be completely transitioned to ASF teams.  
17. The United States could gain influence with Pakistan through this strategy.  
Natural and mineral resources are being sold to black markets, which lead 
into Pakistan.  It is likely that many locals living along the Afghan-
Pakistan border regions heavily depend upon them.  Afghanistan’s natural 
and mineral resources can be used as a point of leverage to gain 
cooperation from Pakistan and its lawless regions.  Furthermore, by 
leveraging the natural and minerals resources that exist throughout the 
border region, more oversight can be established in these areas.  If the 
people living in these regions think they’ll get paid more money for their 
natural and mineral resources by selling them to official investors, they’ll 
likely stop selling them on the black markets and increase their 
acknowledgement of law and order.   
18. Americans will make mistakes while implementing this plan, it’s human 
nature.  Those who do so must be held accountable, or at a minimum, 
directed to depart Afghanistan and no longer be a part of this strategy.  
The Afghans do not forget foreigner’s mistakes, no matter how they’re 
assessed by people other than themselves.    
19. This Resource Network Strategy has two watchwords, networks and 
benefits.  Fewer people on the ground—with ties to vast networks and 
offering actual benefits to locals—will be more effective than military 
units holed up in large outposts and forward operation bases.  These, often 
conventional units, typically only have sporadic access to the locals and 
offer very few lasting benefits to them.   
Finally, American service members having already been deployed or preparing to 
deploy to Afghanistan, their families, and taxpayers deserve a reason and purpose for 
supporting the situation there.  Strategic and long-term success in most wars become a 
contest of thought, and American involvement during the way forward in Afghanistan 
must become a part of this contest.  The United States cannot keep spending its human 
and financial resources, suffering continued losses in credibility, without enjoying some 
kind of lasting strategic benefits.  United States Special Operations Forces are low-cost 
assets, and have the motivation, capabilities, and experience to mount and sustain a 
                                                 
268 Afghan Special Forces (ASF) are trained by, and designed to be similar to, the U.S. Army “Green 
Berets.”  
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winning strategy in Afghanistan.  To date, the idea of a Resource Network Strategy has 
yet to be trumped by a more suitable and sustainable strategy that seeks to achieve 
positive and long-lasting effects in Afghanistan.  The Resource Network Strategy 
deserves a chance, and its implementation may put the hearts and minds of many at ease 
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APPENDIX THE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL USES OF 
AFGHANISTAN’S NATURAL AND MINERAL RESOURCES. 
1. Asbestos is a component of roofing products, heat-resistant gaskets, and 
friction and fire resistant materials.269 
2. Barite is most commonly used as a weighting agent while drilling in high-
density muds; also as a paint pigment and a weighted filler for paper (i.e. 
playing cards), cloth, and rubbers (i.e., “anti-sail” mudflaps for trucks); 
and in a wide variety of compounds used during radiation shielding and 
detection during x-ray processes at hospitals, power plants, and 
laboratories.270   
3. Bauxite is the principle ore of aluminum and commonly used with other 
materials for sandblasting, and as an abrasive material in products such as 
sandpaper, and polishing powders and suspensions. Bauxite is also used as 
a propellant in drilling operations, keeping fractures in reservoir rocks 
open while pumping high-pressure oil and natural gases through them.271   
4. Carbonatite often contains a number of REEs and minerals such as 
niobium, tantalum, copper, iron, and fluorine.272   
5. Celestite is primarily used for the production of strontium carbonate and 
other strontium compounds.  Strontium compounds are found in television 
picture tubes and computer monitors due to their ability to absorb X-rays 
and improve the brilliance of glass.  Strontium is also used producing 
ceramics magnets; and fireworks, marine flares, and tracer ammunition 
due to it producing a brilliant red flame while burning.273   
6. Chalcopyrite is most commonly used independently or with other minerals 
as semiconductors, and as components of nonlinear optical (photo-voltaic) 
devices, detectors, and solid-state lighting applications.274   
                                                 
269 “Asbestos in a Nutshell,” About.com, accessed November 7, 2013, 
http://geology.about.com/od/nutshells/a/asbestosnuts.htm.  
270 “Barite,” accessed November 15, 2013, http://geology.com/minerals/barite.shtml. 
271 “Bauxite,” accessed November 15, 2013, http://geology.com/minerals/bauxite.shtml. 
272 British Columbia, “N—Carbonatites,” accessed November 7, 2013, 
http://www.empr.gov.bc.ca/Mining/Geoscience/MineralDepositProfiles/ListbyDepositGroup/Pages/NCarb
onatites.aspx. 
273 Department of Manufacturing, Government of Australia, “Innovation, Trade, Resources and 
Energy, DMITRE Minerals,” accessed November 7, 2013, 
http://www.minerals.dmitre.sa.gov.au/geological_survey_of_sa/commodities/celestite.  
274 Bijayalaxmi Panda, “Structural and Electronic Properties of Chalcopyrite Semiconductors” (PhD 
diss., National Institute of Technology, Rourkela), accessed November 15, 2013, 
http://ethesis.nitr//kl.ac.in/2699/1/thesis.pdf, 29.  
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7. Chromite is a common component of the materials used for producing 
stainless steel tools, chrome plating, ball bearings, and the inner linings of 
weapon barrels.275  
8. Clay is very heat-resistant and insulating, and is a component commonly 
used in making bricks, cement, cooking pots, porcelain, wall and floor 
tiles, and drainage pipes.276  
9. Coal is used as a fuel by being burned in systems that produce electricity; 
combined with other materials to create steel, cement, and liquid fuel; and 
is a valuable import and export throughout the world.277   
10. Cobalt is a common component of alloys used to produce electroplating 
that give objects an attractive surface and resistance to oxidization.278   
11. Copper is a major component of ship sheathing, roofing materials, 
ornamental and decorative products, piping, electrical wiring, heating and 
air conditioning system parts, and coinage. 279  
12. Dolomite’s most common use is for construction purposes, including 
being crushed for road base and underlayment, and as an aggregate for 
concrete, asphalt, and railroad ballasts; and as a component of cement 
mixtures that are cut into dimension stones. It is also used as a feed 
additive for livestock; an acid neutralizer in the chemicals and mining 
industry; and an ingredient for the production of glass, bricks, and 
ceramics.280   
13. Emeralds are commonly used as ornamental jewelry, and for decorative 
materials that are not worn; and among superstitious populations, used for 
their perceived healing and “magical” powers.281  
14. Fluorite is often combined with other minerals while used in the 
metallurgical, ceramics, chemical, optical, and engraving industries. In 
particular, fluorspar (a product of fluorite) is used to make glazes and 
treatments that produce hard-glossy and opalescent surfaces, and objects 
appear more attractive and durable.  Products that include fluorite as a 
                                                 
275 “Chromite,” accessed November 7, 2013, http://geology.com/minerals/chromite.shtml. 
276 Earth Science, “London’s Geology, Clay and Clay Minerals,” accessed on November 15, 2013, 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/es/impact/geology/london/ucl/materials/clay.  
277 World Coal Association, “Uses of Coal,” accessed November 15, 2013, 
http://www.worldcoal.org/coal/uses-of-coal/. 
278 Jefferson Lab, “The Element Cobalt,” accessed November 7, 2013, 
http://education.jlab.org/itselemental/ele027.html. 
279 Taylor et al., Summary of the Aynak, 76; Lindsey Taylor, “Smooth Operator-Talc Gets Specialized 
Growth,” Industrial Minerals, 428 (May, 2003): 24–33.  
280 “Dolomite,” accessed November 15, 2013, http://geology.com/minerals/dolomite.shtml. 
281 Gemstone Education, “The Uses of Emerald,” accessed November 15, 2013, 
http://www.gemstoneeducation.com/Emerald_2.htm.  
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component are foam countertops, specialty glasses, ceramics, enamelware, 
and Teflon® coated cookware.  The most common bulk usage of fluorspar 
is for making iron, steel, and other metals.282   
15. Galena is an ore that often contains lead and silver.283   
16. Gold is a major component of jewelry, electrical wiring and circuitry, 
conductors in items such as computers and smart phones, and dental 
crowns; and formed into bullion and coins for collectors and investment 
purposes.  Additionally, gold is used in treating a small number of medical 
conditions such as rheumatoid arthritis and cancer; and during space 
exploration due to the metal’s durability.284   
17. Granite is a very common component of statues, sculptures and their 
bases; structural and veneer building stones; architectural trim; paving and 
curbstones; and grave markers.285 
18. Gypsum is a component of common building materials, such as wallboard, 
cement, and various types of plaster.  Gypsum is also used in soil 
conditioning, as a hardener of Portland cement, and for a variety of 
ornamental purposes.286   
19. Iron is a primary component of steel and other materials used for building 
railroad tracks, bridges, skyscrapers, automobiles, aircrafts, ships, heavy 
carriers and machineries; cookware due its higher heat tolerances; and 
stainless steel for kitchen cutlery and appliances.287   
20. Laterite is clay and rock, most often red in color, and is commonly used to 
produce larger bricks for construction, and when crushed, as gravel for 
road surfacing. This type of rock, for its porous characteristics, is also 
used for developing artificial aquifers in rural areas.288  
21. Lead is an important component of lead-acid batteries, ammunition, 
oxides in glass and ceramics, casting metals, and metal sheeting.289 
                                                 
282 “Fluorite (Also Known as Fluorspar),” accessed November 15, 2013, 
http://geology.com///minerals/fluorite.shtml. 
283 “Galena,” accessed November 15, 2013, http://geology.com/minerals/galena.shtml. 
284 “The Many Uses of Gold,” accessed November 7, 2013, http://geology.com/minerals//gold/uses-
of-gold.shtml. 
285 U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), “Granite: Characteristics, Uses and Problems,” 
accessed November 15, 2013, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/111938. 
286 “Gypsum,” accessed November 15, 2013, http://geology.com/minerals/gypsum.shtml. 
287 “Uses of Iron,” accessed November 7, 2013, http://www.usesof.net/uses-of-iron.html. 
288 J. S. Nogami and D. F. Villibor, “Use of Laterite Fine-grained Soils in Road Pavement Base 
courses,” Geotechnical & Geological Engineering, 9, no. 3–4 (September–December 1991): 167–182, 
accessed November 7, 2013, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007percent2FBF00881739#.  
289 “Uses of Lead,” accessed November 15, 2013, http://geology.com/usgs/lead/. 
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22. Lithium-pegmatite contains lithium.  Lithium is a component of medicines 
that treat mental illnesses; medically-related enzymes, hormones, and 
vitamins; and aluminum, greases, castings, thermoplastics, ceramics and 
glasses, aluminum, and long-lasting batteries.290  
23. Marble is primarily used for outdoor sculptures and their bases; and 
components of exterior walls, veneers, and flooring in architecture.291  
24. Mercury is used independently or mixed with other metals and chemicals 
to produce advertising and road signs, electrical switches, thermometers, 
barometers, diffusion pumps, pesticides, batteries, catalysts, and tooth 
repair material.292 
25. Phosphates are used for their functionality in water-based paints and 
coatings; in processing various ceramic products; treating potable water; 
in cleaning solutions to reduce mildew and stains on vinyl siding; and in 
an acidic form, to polish aluminum and aluminum alloys.293 
26. Phosphorous is widely used in agriculture and an essential component in 
fertilizers, feed, and pesticides; and a other items such as explosives, nerve 
agents, friction matches, fireworks, toothpaste, and detergents.294  
27. Platinum is a component of catalytic converters found in automobiles, 
laboratory equipment, electrical contacts and electrodes, thermometers, 
dental equipment, and jewelry; and formed into bullion and coins for 
collectors and investment purposes.295  
28. Quartz is a common component of various types of glasses; when finely 
ground, is used for sandblasting, as a flux for smelting metals, and as grit 
for sanding and sawing; and scouring cleaners and grinding equipment.296    
29. Beryllium is used as an alloying agent in producing beryllium copper, 
which is used for developing springs, electrical contacts, and spot-welding 
electrodes and non-sparking tools; structural materials for high-speed 
                                                 
290 Rodinialithium, “Main Uses of Lithium,” accessed November 7, 2013, 
http://rodinialithium.com/lithium/lithium_uses/. 
291 GSA, “’Marble: Characteristics, Uses and Problems,” accessed November 8, 2013, 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/111858.  
292 “Periodic Table, Mercury,” accessed November 15, 2013, http://www.rsc.org/periodic-
table/element/80/mercury.  
293 “Phosphate Facts,” accessed November 12, 2013, http://www.phosphatefacts.org/index/asp.  
294 European Commission, “Environment, Use of Phosphorous and its Resource Availability,” 
accessed November 15, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/natres/phosphorous.htm.  
295 “Platinum: Uses,” accessed November 7, 2013, https://www.webelements.com/platinum/uses.html. 
296 “Quartz,” accessed November 7, 2013, http://geology.com/minerals/quartz.shtml. 
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aircraft, missiles, and spacecraft and communications satellites; and in 
nuclear reactors as a reflector or moderator.297   
30. Cesium, due to its properties, has been used in electron tubes, 
photoelectric cells, and as a catalyst.298   
31. Niobium is a partial component of the arc-welding rods used in joining 
certain grades of stainless steel; material is used in developing advanced 
airframes for spacecraft, and superconductive magnetics in strong 
magnetic fields for large-scale generation of electricity; and is commonly 
used in making jewelry.299  
32. Salt is used for numerous purposes, including: as a flux to purify 
aluminum; in bread and pastries; to can and curing meats and vegetables; 
in caustic sodas and chlorines to form brines; as a component for making 
cheeses; being poured down drill holes during drilling operations 
conducted in sandy terrain to stop drill-hole walls from collapsing inward; 
for general cooking; curing hides of animals; as a component used in 
making soaps and glycerine; in swimming pools for water treatment; for 
use as a condiment; the dyeing of textiles; and water softening.300 
33. Sand and gravel are used for a number of reasons, some being: 
components for making concrete, asphalt, blocks, bricks, pipes, roof 
shingles, glass, coating icy roads and sidewalks for traction, building 
railroad ballasts; water filtration techniques; and as abrasives.301   
34. Silver is commonly used independently or mixed with other chemicals and 
metals to produce jewelry, silverware, monetary coinage, dental alloys, 
mirrors, bactericides, solder and brazing alloys, electrical contacts, high 
capacity silver-zinc and silver-cadmium batters, paints for printed circuits, 
and solar panels.  Additionally, silver is used in photography, mirror 
production, research; and formed into bullion and coins for collectors and 
investment purposes.302    
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gov/41.shtml.  
300 WA Salt Supply, “Salt and Its Uses,” accessed November 8, 2013, 
http://www.wasalt.com.au//SaltUses.html.  
301 Minerals Education Coalition, “Sand and Gravel,” accessed November 13, 2013, 
http://www.mineralseducationcoalition.org/minerals/sand-and-gravel.  
302 Silver Users Association, “About Silver,” accessed November 15, 2013, 
http://www.silveruse/rsassociation.org/silver/commonuses.shtml.  
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35. Sphalerite is the primary ore of zinc, and is also mined for the small 
amounts of other materials (indium, cadmium, germanium, and gallium) 
commonly found in it.303   
36. Sulfur is very commonly used to make sulfuric acid, often for the metals 
mining industry; and also as a component used in the production of 
fertilizers, petroleum-based (rubber) products, and organic and inorganic 
chemicals.304  
37. Talc-magnesite contains a high concentration of talc, which is a primary 
component of talcum powder, and partial component of cement, fillers, 
fertilizers, ceramics, paints, paper, plastics, roofing materials, and 
electronic parts.305   
38. Tantalum is a common component of wires and powders used to develop 
digital capacitors.  Capacitors that include tantalum are used in digital 
space-sensitive and high-end telecommunications, data storage, and 
implantable medical devices.306 
39. Tennantite is most commonly combined with other chemicals for use as a 
corrosive substance for metals decomposition, and also to determine the 
composition and locations of other natural and mineral resources.307  
40. Tin is a common component of materials used for lighting devices, such as 
lanterns, candle shields, wall sconces, and mirror frames; roofing and 
building products used for water protection and channeling, such as 
flashings, coverings, shingles, tiles, sheet metals, and shutters; protective 
fire (“fireproof”) products; and ornamental products for homes and 
buildings.308   
41. Travertine is rock most commonly used as a material for covering the 
exteriors of religious temples, paving patios and garden paths, wall 
cladding and indoor flooring; and to cover any surfaces likely to be 
exposed to outdoor elements for long periods of time.309  
                                                 
303 “Sphalerite,” accessed November 15, 2013, http://geology.com/minerals/sphalerite.shtml. 
304 Minerals Education Coalition, “Sulfur,” accessed November 13, 2013, 
http://www.mineralseducationcoalition.org/minerals/sulfur. 
305 “Talc: The Softest Mineral,” accessed November 7, 2013, http://geology.com/minerals/talc.shtml. 
306 Global Advanced Metals, “Applications,” accessed November 15, 2013, 
http://globaladvancedmetals.//com/about-tantalum/applications.aspx. 
307 Sandro Fadda, Maddalena Fiori, and Silvia Maria Grillo, “Chemical Variations in Tetrahedrite-
tennantite Minerals from the Furtei Epithermal Au Deposits,” Sardinia, Italy: Mineral Zoning and Ore 
Fluids Evolution,” Geochemistry, Mineralogy, and Petrologoy, 43, Sofia (2005), accessed November 15, 
2013, http://www.geology.bas.bg//mineralogy/gmp_files/gmp43/Fadda.pdf.  
308 GSA, “Tin: Characteristics, Uses and Problems,” accessed November 15, 2013, 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/111762. 
309 “What is Travertine?” accessed November 7, 2013, http://what-is-travertine.com.  
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42. Tungsten is common component of cutting tools used in drilling for oil 
and gas, mining and construction; wear-resistant materials for 
metalworking; more recently jewelry; and is mixed with carbon to make a 
strong and resistant material—tungsten carbide.310   
43. Uranium is often used by militaries as a component of high-density 
munitions penetrators, shielding material for transporting radioactive 
materials, and fuel for nuclear submarines; and by civilians primarily for 
the use fuel in nuclear power plants.311   
44. Zinc has anticorrosive properties and is commonly used for galvanizing 
items susceptible to water damage, such as automobile parts, construction 
equipment, and outdoor electrical components; and is commonly used for 
separating gold from other minerals; and often a component of rubber and 




                                                 
310 Minerals Education Coalition, “Tungsten,” accessed November 15, 2013, 
http://www.mineralseducationcoalition.org/minerals/tungsten.  
311 Uranium Council, “Uranium Facts,” Australian Government, Department of Resources, Energy, 
and Tourism, accessed November 7, 2013, 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/Mining/uranium/1UsesforUranium.pdf.  
312 “Uses of Zinc, the Metal That is Key to Preventing Corrosion,” accessed November 15, 2013, 
http://geology.com/usgs/uses-of-zinc/.  
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